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INTRODUCTION 
The firm has come undone.1  The break-up started as an idea in 
finance, where options pricing and transaction cost analysis traced 
the firm’s fault lines with theoretical implications about how the firm 
funds itself.2  Then, traders went to work, turning these financial in-
 
 1 Instead of thinking of it as a solid entity, see the firm as a cipher and account-
ing rules as the symbol system that constitutes and decodes the cipher.  Accounting 
theorists see the firm this way.  See, e.g., Jim Donegan & Shyam Sunder, Contract Theo-
retic Analysis of Off-Balance Sheet Financing, J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN., March 1989, at 
203, 204 (“From the representational faithfulness perspective, the firm is seen as a 
collection of economic facts; accounting methods are evaluated by their ability to 
produce numbers and disclosures that approximate these facts as closely as possi-
ble.”) (citations omitted).  The “facts” are value propositions about cash flows and 
contingencies.  The law of financial reporting is the syntax and the grammar of this 
language and each financial report is a novel utterance.  A good transactional lawyer 
is a finance semiotician too.  See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Semiotics, Herme-
neutics, and Cash: An Essay on the True and Fair View, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
893, 894–95 (2003) (arguing that a hermeneutic approach to accounting would fa-
cilitate the convergence of national accounting standards). 
 2 Two major insights that in particular helped to atomize the firm’s cash flows 
were options pricing and transaction cost economics.  In 1973, a paper by Fischer 
Black and Myron Scholes transformed finance by demonstrating a mathematical ap-
proach to pricing options and corporate liabilities.  Fischer Black & Myron S. Scho-
les, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973).  A new 
part of financial speech, options pricing let traders estimate the value of bundles of 
financial risk which had previously been held hostage to whole asset forms.  In other 
words, the Black-Scholes model helped to demonstrate that an option is the smallest 
unit of financial contingency.  See infra note 185 for an example of an options pricing 
analogy for the federal government’s risk with respect to federally-insured deposits.  
Maturing after options pricing, transaction cost economics provided an intellectual 
foundation for increased scrutiny of the “make-or-buy” problem as applied to fund-
ing.  See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937), reprinted in THE NATURE OF THE 
FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 18 (Oliver Williamson ed., 1990) (illu-
minating how a firm’s organizational structure reflects the decisions by a firm to 
economize on costs by sometimes internalizing factors of production and, at other 
times buying them in the open market); see also OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 2–12 (1985) (putting the 1937 article in the context of 
the analytical approaches which developed in its wake).  See infra notes 257–61, 275–
78 and accompanying text for recommendations to reduce the transaction costs of 
gathering information about firms’ effective capital structure in order to promote 
greater investor understanding of firm funding.  See generally Charles R.P. Pouncy, 
Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and Alternatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 505, 551–
54 (1998) (arguing that the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, modern portfolio 
theory, the Modigliani-Miller theorem about optimal capital structure, and options 
pricing provided the rationale for wide use of new financial products). 
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sights into self-sustaining markets where firms could meet their needs 
for liquidity and capital with complex products.3  Here, securitization 
and other forms of disintermediation made funds more mobile4 and 
helped to “complete” the financial markets.5  Understandably, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and accounting regula-
tors did not keep pace with these dynamic shifts.6  Before these shifts, 
 
 3 When used to describe a firm, “liquidity” means the firm’s ability to satisfy its 
payment obligations as they become due.  See U.S. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
LIQUIDITY: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 1 (2001), available at http://www.occ.treas. 
gov/handbook/liquidity.pdf.  Prudential regulation of depository institutions has the 
most systematic approach to firm liquidity.  See also generally JARL KALLBERG & 
KENNETH PARKINSON, CORPORATE LIQUIDITY: MANAGEMENT AND MEASUREMENT (1993).  
See Pouncy, supra note 2, at 527–34, 569–71 (showing how competition and interest 
in speculation led to intermediation in firm funding through swaps, derivatives, 
money market instruments, and securitization). 
 4 “Funding” refers to how the firm finances its activities.  See LIQUIDITY: 
COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 9–22 (summarizing liquidity sources and 
distinguishing between retail and wholesale funding sources).  In general, funding 
relates to the liabilities and equity accounts on the right hand side of the balance 
sheet.  An operational rather than legal concept, funding refers to how the firm stays 
afloat as an obligor.  To appreciate what funding means to transactional lawyers, visit 
The Bond Market Association, Funding, http://www.bondmarkets.com/funding 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2006). “Disintermediation” means any substitution in the fund-
ing market by one liquidity or capital source for another.  See LIQUIDITY: 
COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 1–2 (explaining how the shift from retail 
to wholesale funding by banks has increased their overall liquidity risk).  A là Coase, 
transaction cost efficiencies drive these substitutions.  For example, the commercial 
paper market took off because high-quality borrowers could borrow more cheaply by 
issuing their own paper to investors rather than by getting a bank loan.  See John P. 
Judd, Competition Between the Commercial Paper Market and Commercial Banks, ECON. REV. 
(1st Q. 1979), at 39.  Similarly, transaction accounts with nonbank financial institu-
tions have diverted customer deposits from banks, now scrambling for low-cost fund-
ing.  (Deposits were the manna of bank funding because they were cheap.)  See, e.g., 
Robert Litan, The Revolution in U.S. Finance: Past, Present, and Future, Remarks 
Before The American College, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania (Apr. 30, 1991) (explaining 
how receivables securitization transformed the flow of funds between financial in-
termediaries) (copy on file with author). 
 5 A complete market is one in which all commodities and claims can be traded.  
WILLIAM H. BEAVER, FINANCIAL REPORTING: AN ACCOUNTING REVOLUTION 38–39 (3d 
ed. 1998).  See also Mario Draghi et al., Transparency, Risk Management and Interna-
tional Financial Fragility, at 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 03-118, 2003) (“The 
role of swaps and other privately negotiated derivative instruments is to complete fi-
nancial markets, thus increasing the ability of individuals, financial institutions, cor-
porations and governments to manage risk.”). 
 6 This is another example of the point that “[c]ontemporary financial innova-
tion is a dance between the regulator and the regulated.”  Pouncy, supra note 2, at 
546 (showing how heterodox economic theory reveals a wider range of public risks 
from derivatives and financial innovation generally than does orthodox economics).  
Pouncy notes how firms mitigate the costs of regulation through tactical innovation: 
Kane has characterized this process as the “regulatory dialectic.”  This 
process is a continual struggle between regulators and the regulated in 
which regulatory policy is confronted with financial innovation de-
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readers of financial reports could look to the balance sheet as a 
rough proxy for a firm’s net worth.7  But as firm managers turned in-
creasingly to “off-balance-sheet” (OBS) arrangements like swaps and 
special purpose vehicles, the balance sheet lost its faithfulness as a 
public financial report.8  Investors outside of the charmed circle of 
the financially initiated were lost. 
The gap between what public financial reports say about funding 
and how the cash actually moves in and out of firms became apparent 
with some highly publicized losses at Enron and other large firms, 
many of which involved cash flow games.9  A Greek chorus of indig-
nant legislators, disgruntled investors, and evasive regulators blamed 
the losses on rogue managers and officers at these firms.  These cads 
had broken the rules of the game, said the chorus.  A special fury 
went to the auditors who had given the rogues cover under financial 
accounting.  In this blame narrative, financiers became folk devils 
who threatened virtuous wealth accumulation by retail investors and 
 
signed to circumvent the policy.  Regulatory policy is then adjusted to 
counteract the circumventive innovation, which, in turn, induces an-
other innovative response.  This process is also known as Goodhart’s 
Law, which concludes that “basing a policy upon a recognized statistical 
relationship will bring about a policy-induced change in the relation-
ship.” 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Edward J. Kane, Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Ori-
gins of Financial Innovation, in FINANCIAL INNOVATION 5–6 (William L. Silber ed., 
1975)); see also infra notes 262–75 and accompanying text for a critical evaluation of 
the agency’s knowledge base. 
 7 See infra notes 107–14 and accompanying text to appreciate the scope of the 
balance sheet. 
 8 State law, the certificate of incorporation, or a bond covenant may let other 
corporate constituencies vote on fundamental questions of capital structure.  See 
JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 
156–220 (2004).  It is, however, the firm’s managers who run its day-to-day funding, 
including the use of off-balance-sheet arrangements. 
 9 In addition to Enron, recent prominent corporate scandals have included 
Dynegy (misrepresentation of cash flows on its statement of cash flows), Global 
Crossing (potential phantom transactions with no economic substance), Adelphia 
(three billion dollars in questionable loans), Tyco (charges of tax evasion and evi-
dence tampering), WorldCom (significant accounting irregularities), Xerox Com-
pany (accounting irregularities), Arthur Andersen (obstruction of justice claim), 
KPMG (auditing malfeasance), ImClone (insider trading), and Merrill Lynch & 
Company (deceptive securities analysis).  See generally Jerry W. Markham, Accountants 
Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 725, 773–86 (2003) (reviewing asset write-downs, rising earnings restatements, 
and other accounting irregularities leading to market and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) interventions).  For a bibliography of over one hundred legal, 
administrative, and congressional documents related just to Enron, the most notori-
ous of these scandals, see Stephanie Burke, The Collapse of Enron: A Bibliography of 
Online Legal, Governmental and Legislative Resources, Apr. 15, 2002, http://www.llrx. 
com/features/enron.htm. 
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others.  (Much of what was “lost” was unrealized value created by 
these rogues in the first place using the same accounting practices, 
but more about this later.)  The pattern of losses across firms cast 
doubt on the financial reporting model overall, including the state-
ment of cash flows, a financial report which had previously stood in 
relatively good repute.10   
Financial moral panic!  A moral panic starts with some bit of re-
ality and then mushrooms into a movement for reform as sensational-
ist media reports fuel populist outrage over wrongdoing.11  In a moral 
panic, “[s]tatements that would . . . mark the speaker as hyperbolic or 
paranoid suddenly acquire the status of incontestable fact, while 
skeptics are pitied for their callous denial.”12  In this nervous climate, 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley or 
Act).13  Moral panic legislation blames social problems on bad people 
rather than bad structures and the Act bears these hallmarks by cast-
ing corporate officials and auditors as deviants.  In this case, casting 
financiers as miscreants substituted for a more nuanced examination 
of whether the law of financial reporting adequately mapped firms’ 
true capital structure in light of the dynamic funding shifts of the past 
thirty years.14 
To Congress’s credit, the Act roused the SEC from its slumber 
over accounting.  Specifically, the Act directed the agency to require 
publicly-registered firms to say more about these curious “off-balance-
sheet” items, which had previously escaped much substantive disclo-
sure.15  Under the baleful glare of Congress, the SEC adopted a rule 
 
 10 The balance sheet is built on generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP), the basis for financial accounting.  See Markham, supra note 9, at 765–68 
(reviewing the development of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and 
GAAP). 
 11 See infra notes 32–53 and accompanying text for an explanation of moral panic 
and moral panic analysis. 
 12 PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN 
MODERN AMERICA 7 (1998) (analyzing the moral panics from 1890s–1990s about the 
sexual abuse of minors).  To understand the analogy drawn in this Article, substitute 
“financier” for “child molester.” 
 13 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 7201–66 (Supp. II 2002)). 
 14 By the law of financial reporting I mean only federal securities laws, not state 
laws that impose financial reporting requirements. 
 15 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 401(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7261(c)(1) (Supp. II 2002), 
added § 13(j) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which required the SEC to 
amend its rules to require each annual and quarterly financial report required to be 
filed with the SEC to disclose: 
all material off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations 
(including contingent obligations), and other relationships of the is-
suer with unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may have a ma-
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that selectively increases the transparency of firms’ effective capital 
structure by making them consider the financial impact of some types 
of OBS arrangements.16  When reporting to Congress on the rule’s 
efficacy and the current structure of the OBS market, though, the 
SEC admitted that market transparency problems persist.17  Given the 
ongoing gap between publicly-reported funding and funding as the 
daily practice of survival by firms, do public financial reports say 
enough about how a firm finances itself?  Not yet.  Much of what led 
to Enron and the other losses continues.18  What is needed is a tech-
nical legal approach rather than the now-familiar “perp” walk on the 
nightly news. 
Like marabunta,19 scholars have descended upon the Act’s provi-
sions about corporate governance, the audit process, and accounting 
generally.  My own ant-like contribution to this debate is to frame the 
Act in terms of financial moral panic, to point out how this legislative 
 
terial current or future effect on financial condition, changes in finan-
cial condition, results of operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, 
capital resources, or significant components of revenues or expenses. 
15 U.S.C. § 78m(j) (Supp. II 2002). 
 16 SEC Final Rule: Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis about 
Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-47264 (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
final/33-8182.htm, codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 228–29, 249 (2005).   
 17 See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, SEC, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 401(C) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON ARRANGEMENTS 
WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND TRANSPARENCY 
OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS 40 (2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/soxoffbalancerpt. 
pdf [hereinafter SEC REPORT].  See also infra notes 225–34 and accompanying text 
about the SEC’s conclusion that opacity persists with respect to the transparency of 
firms’ OBS dealings. 
 18 See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May,” 48 
VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1264 (2003) (arguing that Sarbanes-Oxley failed to appreciate the 
significance of risk from OBS derivatives to the Enron crisis): 
     Moreover, pre-Enron market failures are likely to continue if certain 
structural conditions in the market persist.  First, disclosure related to 
derivatives positions is costly, and those costs are not reduced by the 
collapse of Enron; indeed, the cost of derivatives disclosure is greater if 
market participants are more concerned about such disclosures.  Sec-
ond, it is not necessarily easier for market participants to assess deriva-
tives disclosure (or non-disclosure) post-Enron; they have similar tech-
nological capacity and access to information.  Moreover, the gap 
between what managers know and what shareholders understand could 
persist if both issuers and investors become more sophisticated. 
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 19 Also called the New World Army Ants, the marabunta travel in hordes and de-
vour agricultural land.  See New World Army Ants, http://www.armyants.org (last vis-
ited Feb. 19, 2006); La Marabunta, http://www.lamarabunta.org/ (last visited Feb. 
19, 2006) (Spanish-language site for ant enthusiasts). 
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approach limited the Act’s efficacy in predictable ways, and to rec-
ommend changes to reduce, if possible, the risk of future financial 
moral panics.  Indeed, as noted, post-Enron scholarship ought to re-
store a factual rather than moral approach to complex financial 
transactions.20 
With an argument used historically by the Left, Part I explains 
how financial moral panic was the zeitgeist for the Act.21  In a finan-
cial moral panic, false cause obscures a more complete understand-
ing of cause-in-fact by blaming what are really routine market losses 
on individuals deemed to have acted in exceptionally opportunistic 
ways.  The Act’s legislative history shows how financiers came to be 
viewed as folk devils and financial predators.  Framed this way, their 
misconduct would distract investors and others from ambient eco-
nomic anxieties about the ongoing market risk of unrealized gain in 
financial assets, an anxiety made more acute during a price bubble.  
Unfortunately, structural economic insecurity transcends individual 
misconduct.  Indeed, this insecurity is intrinsic to our economic sys-
tem. 
Turning from cultural studies to financial reporting, Part II ex-
plains, again, why the balance sheet no longer reflects a firm’s finan-
cial position.22  The aim here is to provide a critical counterpoint to 
the prevailing view that financiers at Enron and other firms destroyed 
“real” shareholder value, often with bogus deals involving off-balance-
sheet arrangements.  Indeed, managers’ fiduciary duties to share-
holders may have obliged these managers to use such arrangements 
(and, indeed, may continue to do so) for the sake of increasing re-
 
 20 See Partnoy, supra note 18, at 1247 (arguing that regulatory responses to Enron 
based on the idea that fraud rather than financial complexity of derivatives led to 
Enron are misguided).  Such scholarship has already been developed with respect to 
securitization, which suffered guilt-by-association to the extent that it was associated 
with Enron’s OBS practices.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1568–74 (2004) (clarifying the value of securitization); Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Struc-
tures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1318 (2002) (“Ultimately, the greatest danger of the 
Enron debacle is our possible overreaction, and consequent over-regulation.”); see 
also William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 
1275, 1283 (2002) (“[T]he rogue characterization serves a double function—it de-
flects attention from the respectable community’s own business practices.  This Arti-
cle aspires to counterbalance with a picture of Enron’s collapse that deemphasizes 
the rogue to focus on the regular.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure 
Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (challenging the effi-
cacy of mere disclosure of extremely complex financial instruments because disclo-
sure will not produce a critical mass of investors who understand the transaction rea-
sonably promptly). 
 21 See infra notes 54–104 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 122–34, 217–24 and accompanying text. 
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sidual return.  To show how better cash flow reporting may have 
stemmed these losses, this Article discusses the statement of cash 
flows, a relative late-comer to the financial reporting model.  This is 
part of a plea for reporting a firm’s effective capital structure to im-
prove the overall usefulness of public reports to financial reporting’s 
diverse constituencies, i.e., investors, financial regulators, managers, 
auditors, and information intermediaries.23  More granular disclosure 
would benefit investors (even though it might increase firms’ re-
ported volatility) by reminding investors of the unavoidable uncer-
tainty of future financial states of the world.  Part III then discusses 
the SEC’s OBS disclosure rule.24  In truth, despite its substantial limi-
tations, the rule contributes to the evolution of financial reporting 
because the rule makes firms say more about their effective capital 
structure.25  But more is needed. 
Part IV recommends some technical improvements to these 
technical problems.26  First, the SEC should require firms to disclose a 
transparency ratio on the balance sheet which suggests the magni-
tude of OBS items not otherwise disclosed.27  Revealing the fact of 
nondisclosure would seem to be a corollary of disclosure.28  Such a fi-
nancial transparency ratio would reduce the information gap be-
tween firm insiders and outsiders without too much reporting 
“noise.”  Second, the SEC should require the reporting of more firm-
 
 23 Beaver notes that financial reporting balances the interests of five distinct con-
stituencies: investors choosing between alternative investment portfolios, financial 
reporting regulators concerned about capital formation and resource allocation, 
firms’ managers interested in increasing shareholder wealth and their own, auditors 
who need financial information to certify a firm’s financial reports, and information 
intermediaries involved in searching out and processing “raw” financial data.  See 
BEAVER, supra note 5, at 150–56. 
 24 See infra notes 187–216 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 198–203 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 245–80 and accompanying text. 
 27 I use the word “firm” broadly to mean any business that consumes financial 
capital.  So that includes corporations, partnerships, limited liability entities, business 
trusts, and other forms of business organization.  Federal securities laws require any 
firm with $10 million or more in assets and five hundred or more owners of any class 
of equity securities to register with the SEC.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a–78ll (2000 & Supp. II 2002).  Registrants include the country’s largest 
corporations, thus including those listed on the exchange and over-the-counter secu-
rities markets.  My comments about financial reporting obligations under federal se-
curities law apply only to registrants, but the economic arguments in the Article ap-
ply to all firms. 
 28 There are three kinds of knowledge: what one knows, what one knows that one 
does not know, and what one does not know that he does not know.  The distinction 
reflects the behavioral assumption that “human behavior is intendedly rational, but 
only limitedly so . . . .” HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION xxiv (1961). 
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level information about cash flow to help market intermediaries fur-
ther disaggregate the firm’s cash flows into tradable units.  The SEC 
could do this through the statement of cash flows.29  If adopted, these 
suggestions would increase transparency, enabling traders and other 
financial intermediaries to further complete funding markets.30  Also, 
the SEC should institutionalize market-wide surveillance of effective 
capital structure to increase the agency’s in-house knowledge about 
funding trends.  So informed, the SEC could better mitigate future 
financial moral panics by responding to fear with facts.  Part V points 
out that there will always be an Enron and that, therefore, transac-
tional law faculty should proselytize students (and seek curricular 
rents from deans) in order to increase the transactional and financial 
sophistication of law students, who could then better inject sobriety 
into future panics.31 
 
 29 In considering cash flow, I join others who note the value of liquidity disclo-
sures.  See Matthew J. Barrett, The SEC and Accounting, in Part Through the Eyes of Pa-
cioli, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 863–65  (2005) (praising the value of the liquidity 
risk disclosures required to be made by Item 303 of Regulation S-K); Cunningham, 
supra note 1, at 924–30 (arguing that increased accounting focus on the statement of 
cash flows would facilitate international convergence of accounting standards); Jack 
Friedman, Chapter 11 Financial Reporting Rules for Debtors: The Impact on Creditors, Share-
holders, New Investors, and the Bar, 9 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 257, 266 (1992) (noting 
creditor interest in increased disclosure of cash flow information about debtors); 
Henry T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. 
REV. 777, 854–60 (2000) (arguing that mutual funds should be subject to the same 
general liquidity disclosures currently required for publicly-registered companies); 
Stanley Siegel, The Coming Revolution in Accounting: The Emergence of Fair Value as the 
Fundamental Principle of GAAP, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1839, 1850 (1996) (arguing that re-
cent accounting pronouncements recognize the increasing relevance of cash flow 
calculations). 
 30 Accounting considers financial reporting from two distinct but related per-
spectives: financial reporting as an information tool in the service of market effi-
ciency and financial reporting as a measurement device for a firm’s financial charac-
teristics.  See BEAVER, supra note 5, at 76–77.  An informational view evaluates the 
adequacy of financial reports in terms of their marginal informational value to deci-
sion-making about the firm.  Id.  A measurement view strives for fidelity between a 
firm’s financial reports and its financial essence.  Id.  Although the recommendations 
made in Part IV have informational consequences, the thrust of this Article is to 
measure the firm as a financial item in a more comprehensive fashion. 
 31 This Article grew out of teaching the Dynegy case (mentioned supra note 9 and 
discussed infra notes 150–53 and accompanying text) in my corporate finance course 
at the College of Law.  The case resonated with my conclusion from my time in 
Washington, D.C. during the Enron hearings that the law has not adequately thema-
tized useful legal standards about how firms fund themselves.  The two notable ex-
ceptions to this conclusion are the prudential regulation of banks and the net capital 
rule for broker-dealers (discussed infra notes 182–85, 263 and accompanying text), 
two examples of a federal interest in firm funding.  I began writing this Article to 
identify OBS arrangements which would be presumptively material under the appli-
cable disclosure standards.  Deductive presumptions develop in common law after a 
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I. FINANCIAL MORAL PANIC: FINANCIERS AS PREDATORS 
Congress passed the Act after a hue and cry went up about inves-
tor and employee losses caused by accounting irregularities at several 
national firms.32  Typical of moral panic legislation, the Act focused 
on bad actors rather than on bad structures.33  In particular, the 
thorny issue that the Act and the prior congressional hearings 
dodged was the extent of economic insecurity intrinsic to an econ-
omy such as ours, in which most people’s wealth takes the form of 
unrealized gain in financial assets.  As discussed in the following sec-
tion, displacement of this sort is par for a moral panic.  What was 
novel about this one was the symbiotic (and ambivalent) relationship 
between the moral discourse against the market and the critics’ psy-
chological and financial investment in the market itself.  Let me start 
by explaining moral panic and moral panic analysis. 
A. Moral Panic and Moral Panic Analysis 
Moral panic theory claims that the media, moral entrepreneurs, 
government authorities, and special interest groups (including values 
communities) often react to a perceived threat to a fundamental so-
cial interest by invoking a deviant to blame for the perceived threat.34  
Stanley Cohen, now a sociologist at the London School of Economics, 
introduced the moral panic concept to analyze nervous British reac-
tions to public brawling between two youth groups in Britain: the 
 
period of gestation through inductive adjudication.  I had wanted to shortcut that 
process, since presumptions can add legal certainty to compliance and can help 
judges faced with adjudicating the materiality of complex OBS items.  My research, 
however, did not turn up enough aggregate data about effective capital structure to 
let me articulate a presumption about the materiality of OBS items.  So, I offer the 
financial transparency ratio discussed herein, infra notes 248–56 and accompanying 
text, as a basis for a future presumption about materiality.  I leave the project of 
building presumptions to the future, my own as well as that of colleagues, critics, and 
allies. 
 32 See supra note 9 listing some of the more prominent examples of the losses at-
tributed to accounting irregularities. 
 33 See infra notes 95–104 and accompanying text. 
 34 See STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS xxxi (3d ed. 2002).  Cohen 
notes a concurrent use of the term by another researcher control (Jock Young), and 
assumes that both traced the idea of moral panic to Marshall McLuhan.  Id.; see gener-
ally MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1964).  
Other British sociologists like Stuart Hall also popularized the idea, which formed 
part of the cultural studies movement.  See infra note 68 and accompanying text for 
Hall’s argument about the racialized construction of mugging.  See generally Michael 
Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1751, 
1782–84 (1999) (reviewing the original clash between the Mods and the Rockers 
leading to early moral panic analysis). 
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Mods and the Rockers.35  He defined a moral panic as a situation in 
which a 
condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to be-
come defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature 
is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass 
media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, poli-
ticians and other right-thinking people; [and] socially accredited 
experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions.36 
Reviewing the deployment of the concept over its busy thirty-year life, 
Cohen recently identified seven classic social situations which trigger 
a moral panic.37  What the triggers have in common is that they are 
perceived by the usual authorities (Church, state, the family or their 
diverse proxies) to threaten the social or moral order: young, work-
ing class violent males;38 school violence;39 recreational drug use;40 
child abusers, Satanists, and pedophiles;41 popular dissemination of 
sexual and violent content; welfare cheats and single mothers;42 and 
refugees and asylum seekers.  Though comprehensive, this is not an 
 
 35 See COHEN, supra note 34, passim. 
 36 See id. at 1. 
 37 See id. at viii–xxi.  Most of these situation predicates have generated legal schol-
arship applying moral panic analysis.   
 38 See, e.g., John M. Hagedorn, Gang Violence in the Postindustrial Era, 24 CRIME & 
JUST. 365, 376 (1998) (noting tendency to construct male gangs as deviant during a 
moral panic). 
 39 See, e.g., Aaron H. Caplan, Public School Discipline for Creating Uncensored Anony-
mous Internet Forums, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 112–20 (2003) (noting moral panic 
over use of Internet by teenagers). 
 40 See, e.g., Kathleen Auerhahn, The Split Labor Market and the Origins of Antidrug 
Legislation in the United States, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 411, 411–16 (1999) (using moral 
panic analysis to explain how anti-drug legislation acts to manage the formation of 
class interests); Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and 
Population Trends, 26 CRIME & JUST. 63, 85–86 (1999) (noting that drug trafficking and 
child abuse have recently produced moral panics). 
 41 See, e.g., Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
209, 232 (2001) (noting moral panic in connection with child abuse); John Comaroff 
& Jean Comaroff, Policing Culture, Cultural Policing: Law and Social Order in Postcolonial 
South Africa, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 513, 514–16 (2004) (explaining a moral panic in 
South Africa in response to occult-related violence). 
 42 See Megan Weinstein, The Teenage Pregnancy “Problem”: Welfare Reform and the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 13 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 117, 144 (1998) (noting moral panic in response to teen sexual activ-
ity); Rachael Knight, Comment, From Hester Prynne to Crystal Chambers: Unwed Mothers, 
Authentic Role Models, and Coerced Speech, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 481, 486 (2004) 
(analogizing to moral panic to explain the treatment of unwed mothers). 
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exhaustive list.  Crime triggers much moral panic.43  Sexual and gen-
der minorities are also favorite targets of moral panics.44 
In each of these cases, an incident or pattern catalyzes pre-
existing social anxiety and an ad hoc issues movement is born.  The 
media fans the flames through sensationalist and reductionist news 
stories.45  As Cohen notes, identifying a “folk devil” to blame takes the 
place of cooler consideration of multivariate causes which may have 
contributed to the original trigger.46  Usually, a hasty legal reform re-
sults from the panic.  Driven as it is by irrationality, the reforms usu-
ally miss the point of the original problem and suffer from dispropor-
tionality.47 
A remedial move made by socially conscious critics, moral panic 
theory contests the “folk devil” construction of the problem and re-
frames it, instead emphasizing structural causes.  Thus, moral panic 
theory reveals the unstated ideological interests at work in a particu-
lar framing of a problem by allowing us “to identify and conceptual-
ize the lines of power in any society, the ways we are manipulated into 
taking some things too seriously and other things not seriously 
enough.”48  In discussing the Mods and the Rockers, Cohen lists the 
two key aspects of a moral panic which moral panic theory targets, 
i.e., an ideological slant and false causation: 
[T]he point [of moral panic analysis] was to expose social reac-
tion not just as over-reaction in some quantitative sense, but first 
as tendentious (that is, slanted in a particular ideological direction) 
and second, as misplaced or displaced (that is, aimed—whether de-
 
 43 See, e.g., Sarah Eschholz, The Media and Fear of Crime: A Survey of the Research, 9  
J. LAW. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 46–52 (1997) (analyzing the relationship between media cov-
erage of crime and fear of crime); Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of 
Megan’s Law, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1535, 1581–88 (2004) (noting disparate impact on Afri-
can Americans of Megan’s Laws requiring registration of persons convicted of sexual 
offenses); Neil Gilbert, Advocacy Research and Social Policy, 22 CRIME & JUST. 101, 105 
(1997) (noting in connection with rape that research conducted by issue advocates 
may contribute to sensationalized reporting); Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders 
and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 860–86 
(2000) (using moral panic idea to explain the selected increase in criminal punish-
ment in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s). 
 44 See Nancy J. Knauer, Homosexuality as Contagion: From the Well of Loneliness to the 
Boy Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401, 438, (2000) (using moral panic to explain hetero-
normative reprisal to expressions of same-sex identity); Marc S. Spindelman, Reori-
enting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. REV. 359, 446 (2001) (linking constitutional 
validation of criminal homosexual sodomy statute to moral panic about AIDS). 
 45 See COHEN, supra note 34, at 1. 
 46 Id. at xxii. 
 47 Id.  See also JENKINS, supra note 12. 
 48 See COHEN, supra note 34, at xxxv. 
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liberately or thoughtlessly—at a target which was not the ‘real’ 
problem).49 
While a moral panic fixates on individual deviants, moral panic 
analysis tries to refocus the policy debate on the web of institutions, 
ideological interests, and other drivers that work in concert to recast 
social anxieties into a discourse about bad people rather than bad 
conditions.50  Moral panic theory must evolve in light of changes in 
media structure and in reaction to complementary theories of social 
construction and cultural studies, of which moral panic was an im-
portant harbinger.51  By extending the analysis beyond the usual au-
thorities and the usual suspects,52 my aim is to expand the reach of 
moral panic arguments into financial legislation as well.53 
 
 49 Id. at xxxi. 
 50 Id. at xxii: 
To point to the complexities of the relationship between social objects 
and their interpretations is not a ‘criticism’ but the whole point of 
studying deviance and social control.  Some trivial and harmless forms 
of rule-breaking can indeed be ‘blown out of all proportion.’  And yes, 
some very serious, significant and horrible events—even genocide, po-
litical massacres, atrocities and massive suffering—can be denied, ig-
nored or played down.  Most putative problems lie between these two 
extremes—exactly where and why calls for a comparative sociology of 
moral panic that makes comparisons within one society and also be-
tween societies. 
 51 See Angela McRobbie & Sarah L. Thornton, Rethinking ‘Moral Panic’ for Multi-
Mediated Social Worlds, 46 BRIT. J. SOC. 559, 560 (1995). 
Although both the original model of moral panics and the reformula-
tions which introduced notions of ideology and hegemony were exem-
plary interventions in their time, we argue that it is impossible to rely 
on the old models with their stages and cycles, univocal media, mono-
lithic societal or hegemonic reactions.  The proliferation and fragmen-
tation of mass, niche and micro-media and the multiplicity of voices, 
which compete and contest the meaning of the issues subject to ‘moral 
panic’, suggest that both the original and revised models are outdated 
in so far as they could not possibly take account of the labyrinthine web 
of determining relations which now exist between social groups and 
the media, ‘reality’ and representation. 
Id.  Cohen notes that theories of social construction, media and cultural studies, and 
the idea of the “risk” society followed the sociology of moral panic analysis.  See 
COHEN, supra note 34, at xxii–xxvi. 
 52 See supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text. 
 53 Security panic analysis is another extension of the moral panic concept.  Secu-
rity panic arguments explain repressive intrusions in civil liberties on perceived 
threats to national security, typically from noncitizens or other outsiders.  See Adrian 
Vermeule, Libertarian Panics, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 871 (2005). 
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B. Financial Moral Panic: When Financiers Become “Folk Devils” 
Financial moral panic is the expression in the explicitly eco-
nomic sphere of the more general form of moral panic.  The public 
discourse about the scandals discussed in this Article was framed in 
the familiar terms of a moral panic.  In this panic narrative, rogue 
managers and auditors threatened public confidence in a vital public 
good—the capital market—risking the solvency of every investor’s fi-
nancial future.  A national auto de fe against financial heresy, the con-
gressional hearings leading up to the Act opened on this tone.54  Con-
sistent with popular accounts of accounting scandals, the legislative 
history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act similarly reflects the reception of 
the blame narrative.55  Some witnesses did testify to the technical na-
 
 54 In Inquisition history, the auto de fe was a public spectacle in which the Crown 
and Inquisition authorities convened in the town square to discipline those who had 
been convicted by Inquisition authorities for violating religious law.  See JEAN PLAIDY, 
THE SPANISH INQUISITION 147–59 (1967).  In Spain, the auto de fe helped to consoli-
date a central national identity by imposing a uniform regulation across geographi-
cally and culturally disparate communities.  Id. at 87–103. 
 55 Notice the invocation of sensationalist media accounts typical of a panic in the 
opening statement of the Committee Chair, Senator Sarbanes: 
     The stunning collapse of Enron has cast a long and dark shadow 
over our capital markets, crowding other important stories off the 
business pages and creating widespread anxiety.  Headlines like: “Wor-
ries of More Enrons To Come Give Prices A Pounding,” The New York 
Times, January 30; and “Nervous and Scandal-Shy Investors Hold Prices 
Down,” The New York Times, February 6, have become routine.  The Bal-
timore Sun just 2 days ago has: “Investors Squeamish Amid Turmoil.”  
And you can pick up virtually any paper in the country and see compa-
rable headlines.  
     . . . As The Washington Post put it, if one company “issued make-
believe accounts, why should anyone believe that dozens of other com-
panies aren’t practicing the same deception?” 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection: Hearings on the Legislative History of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002: Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron 
and Other Public Companies Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 
107th Cong. 1–2  (2002) (opening statement of Chairman Paul S. Sarbanes) [here-
inafter HEARINGS], available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/ 
senate05sh107.html (follow “TEXT” or “PDF” hyperlinks corresponding to S. Hrg. 
107-948). 
Chairman Sarbanes’ focus on media triggers reflects the ongoing value of 
Cohen’s point about the role of the media in a moral panic: 
     The student of moral enterprise cannot but pay particular attention 
to the role of the mass media in defining and shaping social problems.  
The media have long operated as agents of moral indignation in their 
own right: even if they are not self-consciously engaged in crusading or 
muck-raking, their very reporting of certain ‘facts’ can be sufficient to 
generate concern, anxiety, indignation or panic.  When such feelings 
coincide with a perception that particular values need to be protected, 
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ture of the accounting problems which underlay Enron,56 but these 
voices were outnumbered by the gnashing of teeth over lapses in pro-
fessional ethics.  Imputing a simple intent to Congress’s 535 inde-
pendent members often seems farfetched, but not so with respect to 
the sentiment that the corporate officials and auditors in question 
had behaved wantonly.57  Though stopping short of phrenology, the 
 
the preconditions for new rule creation or social problem definition 
are present. 
See COHEN, supra note 34, at 7. 
 56 One witness explicitly warned that merely focusing on bad actors would not 
resolve the structural problems with financial reporting: 
     You will hear or have heard many suggestions for improvement to 
our system of financial reporting and audits of those financial reports.  
Some will say that auditor independence rules need to be strength-
ened.  That external auditors should not be allowed to do consulting 
work and other nonaudit work for their audit clients.  That external 
audit firms should be rotated every 5 years or so.  That oversight of 
auditors needs to be strengthened.  That punishment of wayward audi-
tors needs to be more certain and swift, and so on and on.  In my opin-
ion, those suggestions, even if legislated by Congress and signed by the 
President, will not fix the underlying problem. 
     The underlying problem is a technical accounting problem.  The 
problem is rooted in our rules for financial reporting.  Those financial 
reporting rules need deep and fundamental reform.  Unless we change 
those rules, nothing will change.  Today’s crisis as portrayed by the 
surprise collapse of Enron is the same kind of crisis that arose in the 
1970’s when Penn Central surprisingly collapsed and in the 1980’s 
when hundreds of savings and loan associations collapsed, which pre-
cipitated the S&L bailout by the Federal Government.  There will be 
more of these crisis [sic] unless the underlying rules are changed. 
HEARINGS, supra note 55, at 189–90 (statement of Walter Schuetze, Chief Accountant, 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1992–95).  For example, some of what 
came out in the hearings was that Enron seemingly complied with accounting re-
quirements.  Id. at 577 (prepared statement of Joel Seligman, Dean and Professor, 
Washington University School of Law) (“The off balance sheet transactions that En-
ron employed were made in accordance with generally accepted accounting stan-
dards.”). 
 57 As one legal commentator put it: 
     Congress jumped into the Enron media circus by holding almost 
thirty Enron-related media hearings within three months of that com-
pany’s bankruptcy.  Those hearings in many ways resembled a 
McCarthy-era witch hunt against suspected communists.  Enron execu-
tives were likened to the terrorists who struck America on September 
11, 2001. . . . Great theater, but such histrionics had been little seen 
since Joseph McCarthy left the Senate. 
     Witnesses who did appear to testify were berated, badgered, 
mocked, and cut off if their answers were not what the congressional 
examiner wanted to hear.  One member of Congress insisted on only 
yes or no answers to complicated, convoluted questions that assumed a 
guilty answer. 
JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS: FROM 
ENRON TO REFORM 93 (2005). 
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floor debate from the Act contains numerous aspersions about chief 
executive officers, chief financial officers, and accountants—the folk 
devils of this financial moral panic.58  (Lawyers played a key role in 
the media construction of this moral panic,59 confirming their com-
plicity in feeding a moral panic which they were also in a position to 
critically evaluate.60) 
However, the actual social interest at stake in the scandals rarely 
appeared publicly during the Hearings.  The structural interest which 
these scandals really threatened was a shared “consensus reality” 
about the nature of prosperity, financial value creation, and eco-
 
 58 See 148 CONG. REC. S6734, S6750 (daily ed. July 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. 
Grassley) (“We ought to be correcting the situation so that people have confidence 
and so that crooks who are running our corporations and doing these things that are 
evidenced here.  When I say ‘crooks running our corporations,’ I mean the ones who 
would do this sort of thing to their stockholders and to the country and to the econ-
omy—so that they cannot get away with that in the future.”).  Blaming these indi-
viduals for the losses also required explaining these losses in moral rather than mar-
ket terms, a point that I make below.  See infra notes 61–87 and accompanying text. 
 59 Given that law professors now form part of the chattering class that comments 
in the media about legal controversies, Erwin Chemerinsky’s observations on the 
ethical duties of law professors in this role bear repeating: 
     Consider the first duty of a commentator to be competent.  While 
lawyers may have a sense of how ordinary criminal investigations work 
and how ordinary trials are conducted, political proceedings are a hy-
brid of legal process and political determinations. . . . 
     . . . . 
     There also appeared to be added pressures on commentators  
to speculate on cases occurring in the political, rather than legal, 
arena. . . . 
     . . . . 
     It is more difficult in political commentary to compartmentalize 
one’s opinion from legal description.  Therefore, it is even more im-
portant that commentators in the political arena be aware of their bi-
ases and make full disclosure of them to the media and public. 
Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being a Commentator III, 50 
MERCER L. REV. 737, 748–50 (1999) (arguing for the adoption of a voluntary code of 
ethics for legal commentators). 
 60 In a moral panic, lawyers can function as the disease or the cure: 
The legal system, in the conventional wisdom, should be immune to 
such hysteria, and indeed, should act as a rational and calming force.  
All too often, however, the creation of a moral panic depends on the 
complicity and active participation of the legal system.  Legal actors—
police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, expert witnesses, judges, juries—
have in various ways, the power to affirmatively fuel the creation of in-
stitutionalized hysteria . . . . 
Susan Bandes, The Lessons of Capturing the Friedmans: Moral Panic, Institutional Denial, 
and Due Process,  2 LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. (forthcoming 2006) (arguing that legal 
actors fueled moral panic about the prosecution of Arnold and Jesse Friedman for 
sexual abuse of minors). 
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nomic stability.61  At present, our consensus reality about wealth rests 
on unrealized gain as an important store of value.62  To some extent, 
the New Deal laid the groundwork for the current “consensus reality” 
in which even lower-middle class workers rest their future on unreal-
ized gain in financial assets.63  This view seems to have become the 
 
 61 Consensus reality explains the nature of perceived reality as the result of im-
plicit or explicit agreement between social participants into a contract about what 
the state of the world is.  See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS 10–12 (1970) (noting how theoretical challenges to dominant para-
digms are opposed by incumbent academics that stand to lose reputation by the re-
ception of the new idea).  The idea implies that the experience of reality is contin-
gent and open to paradigm shifts. 
 62 For example, in a paper based on the Federal Reserve triennial survey of con-
sumer finances, a researcher notes “a striking pattern of growth in family income and 
net worth between 1998 and 2001” by offsetting the unrealized appreciation in con-
sumers’ investment holdings against the large increase in liquidated debt of U.S. 
households.  See Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence 
from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 1 (2003) 
(“The level of debt carried by families rose over the period, but the expansion in eq-
uities and the increased values of principal residences and other assets were suffi-
cient to reduce debt as a proportion of family assets.”). 
 63 The New Deal itself was no moral panic because the legislative remedies were 
proportional to the scope of the economic crisis.  Another difference is that the New 
Deal deemphasized individual wrongdoing and emphasized structural reform, unlike 
Sarbanes-Oxley, which focused on increasing criminal penalties for certain white-
collar offenses.  In his history of the New Deal, Robert Leuchtenburg describes how 
the Depression put the nation on a crash course with class consciousness by bringing 
out some of the contradictions about market distribution: 
     The persistence of the depression raised questions not merely about 
business leadership but about capitalism itself.  When so many knew 
want amidst so much plenty, something seemed to be fundamentally 
wrong with the way the system distributed goods.  While the jobless 
wore threadbare clothing, farmers could not market thirteen million 
bales of cotton in 1932.  While children trudged to school in shoes 
soled with cardboard, shoe factories in Lynn and Brockton, Massachu-
setts, had to close down six months of the year. . . . While people went 
without food, crops rotted in the fields. . . . Western ranchers, unable 
either to market their sheep or feed them, slit their throats and hurled 
their carcasses into canyons.  In the plains states, breadlines marched 
under grain elevators heaped high with wheat. 
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 1932–1940, at 
22–23 (1963) (footnotes omitted) (analyzing Roosevelt’s role in institutionalizing 
New Deal programs).  Hunger and need planted the seeds of collective action: 
In February 1933, thousands of former members of barter groups 
seized the county-city building in Seattle.  In the Blue Ridge, miners 
smashed company store windows and storekeepers were given the 
choice of handing out food or having it seized.  Unemployed workers 
in Detroit invaded self-service groceries in groups, filled their baskets, 
and left without paying.  Iowa leagues of the unemployed enlisted job-
less gas and light workers to tap gas and electric lines.  In Des Moines, 
workers boarded streetcars in groups of ten or twenty and told the 
cowed conductors to “charge the fares to the mayor.”  In Chicago, a 
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dominant way that investors conceptualize their wealth.64  Granted, 
the most notorious of these accounting scandals, Enron’s bankruptcy, 
did result in significant realized losses to shareholders, creditors, and 
employees.65  Much of the most sensationalist reporting, however, re-
 
group of fifty-five was charged with dismantling an entire four-story 
building and carrying it away brick by brick. 
Id. at 25 (footnotes omitted). 
 64 In the 1960s a split began developing between technical analysts who measured 
firm profitability with information other than net income and investors who focused 
on short-term earnings.  See BEAVER, supra note 5, at 4 (“In the late 1960s the perspec-
tive shifted from economic income measurement to an ‘informational’ approach.”).  
Investors, however, continued to look at earnings: 
Initially, American investors were concerned primarily with the net 
worth, book value or physical assets of the firm.  Investors then relied 
on income return, dividends and yield as a measure of the firm’s worth.  
Following World War II, high taxes on ordinary income and tax rates 
which favored capital gains shifted investors [sic] attention from divi-
dends to earnings. . . . During the 1960s, instant growth in earnings be-
came the single most important indicator of a stock’s worth in the eyes 
of the investment community. 
Wendy Nelson Espeland & Paul M. Hirsch, Ownership Changes, Accounting Practice and 
the Redefinition of the Corporation, 15 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y 77, 84 (1990) (making a 
hermeneutic argument that accounting methods facilitated the financial conglomer-
ate movement of the 1960s). 
 65 A realized loss means the loss of an actual out-of-pocket outlay of cash or some 
other liquid resource.  In contrast, stock appreciation is unrealized gain until the 
stock is reduced to cash through sale.  “Losing” share appreciation is an unrealized 
loss.  To put it in another way, your consumer debt is your lender’s unrealized gain, 
although collateral may reduce your lender’s market risk.  See LAWRENCE REVSINE ET 
AL., FINANCIAL REPORTING AND ANALYSIS 48–50, 805 (1999). 
Who lost what in Enron?  Enron’s ten largest shareholders lost about $11 billion 
(Alliance Premier Growth, Fidelity Magellan, AIM Value, Putnam Investors, Morgan 
Stanley Dividend Growth, Janus Fund, Janus Twenty, Janus Mercury, Janus Growth 
and Income).  MICHAEL COVEL, TREND FOLLOWING: HOW GREAT TRADERS MAKE 
MILLIONS IN UP OR DOWN MARKETS 122 (2004).  Several public retirement funds in-
curred realized losses.  See, e.g., University of California, Update on the UC’s Enron 
Investments and Lawsuits, http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/enron/ 
q&a.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2006) (announcing a realized loss of $115.5 million on 
shares purchased for $68.50 or $71.34 and sold for an average price of $5.33).  Other 
large losses (indicated here in parentheses) included the Kansas Public Employees 
Retirement System (about $1 million), the City of Fort Worth Retirement Fund 
(nearly $1 million), the Teacher Retirement System of Texas (realized losses of $23.3 
million; unrealized losses of $12.4 million), the Georgia Teachers Retirement System 
($79 million), the New York City Pension Fund ($110 million), and the Ohio State 
Pension Fund ($114 million).  See Turtle Trader, Hall of Shame, http://www. 
turtletrader.com/hall-of-shame.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2006).  For many of the 
large public retirement funds, the losses were relatively insignificant as compared 
with the overall fund size, indicated here in parentheses: Pennsylvania Public School 
Employees’ Retirement System ($50 billion) lost $59 million, less than 0.25%; New 
York State Pension Fund ($112 billion) lost $58 million; Pennsylvania State Employ-
ees’ Retirement System ($24.7 billion) lost $10.6 million; York County, Pennsylvania 
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lated to unrealized losses.66  As reported in the media, the alarm over 
these unrealized losses threatened the ongoing viability of the con-
sensus reality built around unrealized gain.  To recapitulate, protect-
ing the consensus reality was the (unstated) social interest at stake in 
the media construction of the scandals, the Hearings, and the Act, 
i.e., the anxiety driver in Cohen’s model about moral panic.67 
In a general moral panic, though, economic anxiety is displaced 
away from the market and onto social issues.68  My point in this Part 
 
and City Employee Pension Funds ($182 million) lost $1.26 million; and the State of 
West Virginia ($5.4 billion) lost $1 million.  Id. 
 66 Enron employees who had invested in Enron stock suffered significant losses 
of unrealized value, which became realized only when the employees sold their 
shares later.  Enron blocked these employees who had chosen to invest their shares 
in Enron from selling these shares during an eleven-day period in the fall of 2001.  
See Hearings on the Enron Collapse and Its Implications for Worker Retirement Security, Part II 
Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 104 (2002) (statement of 
Mikie Rath, Benefits Manager, Enron Corp.), available at http://edworkforce.house. 
gov/hearings/107th/fc/fchearings.htm (follow “Serial No. 107-42 (PDF, 6.6M)” hy-
perlink).  Enron’s retirement plan gave its staff twenty investment options, including 
mutual funds, a Schwab account, and Enron stock.  Id.  Enron matched contribu-
tions only to its Enron stock.  Id.  Participants could trade the stock in their accounts 
daily, with the exception of the matching contributions of Enron stock, which could 
not be traded before the plan participant reached the age of fifty.  Id.  In the first 
week of October, Enron mailed its employees a notice that, due to a change in the 
plan service provider, a trading suspension would be in effect for eleven trading days, 
from October 29 to November 13, 2001.  Id.  On October 16, 2001, Enron an-
nounced a $618 million third-quarter loss, beginning a downward price spiral in its 
stock.  Press Release, Enron Corp., Enron Reports Recurring Third Quarter Earnings 
of $0.43 Per Diluted Share; Reports Non-Recurring Charges of $1.01 Billion After-
Tax; Reaffirms Recurring Earnings Estimates of $1.80 for 2001 and $2.15 for 2002; 
and Expands Financial Reporting (Oct. 16, 2001), available at http://www.enron. 
com/corp/pressroom/releases/2001/ene/68-3QEarningsLtr.html.  On October 10, 
Enron stock was selling for $35 a share.  By October 26 it had fallen to $15 and by 
November 20 it had fallen to $7 per share.  By the end of November, Enron stock was 
selling for fewer than fifty cents a share.  The lockout occurred during this price 
drop.  Blackout periods routinely occur when plans change service providers or when 
companies merge.  Such periods are intended to ensure that account balances and 
participant information are transferred accurately.  Blackout periods will vary in 
length depending on the condition of the records, the size of the plan, and number 
of investment options.  While there are no specific ERISA rules governing blackout 
periods, plan fiduciaries are obliged to be prudent in designing and implementing 
blackout periods affecting plan investments. 
 67 Clearly there is a tradeoff between increasing the allocative efficiency for firms 
(for example, by letting them off the hook in terms of their legal duties to their em-
ployees) and the distributional equity objective of increasing economic security for 
these same employees.  That conundrum drives the panic. 
 68 Stuart Hall noted the link between economic insecurity and moral panic.  He 
showed how underlying economic anxiety was displaced into an anxiety about “mug-
gings” by black, working class men.  See generally STUART HALL ET AL., POLICING THE 
CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND ORDER (1978) (using moral panic analysis 
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of the Article is to show that in a financial moral panic the economic 
anxiety stays in the economic sphere but plays out in a new form.  Put 
another way, the logic of the financial moral panic must explain the 
losses caused by the scandals without undermining the basic opti-
mism in capital markets overall.  Since indifferent markets could not 
be blamed for these investment and employment losses, bad people 
would have to be.  A parody of Calvinist predestination, causation in 
this instance explained financial losses in terms of personal morality, 
not market movements, as reflected in the moral critiques of account-
ing scandals issued at the time.69 
In truth, a greater challenge to the current consensus reality 
about unrealized wealth comes from the prevalence of economic in-
security in U.S. households, not primarily from rogue financiers.  
Consider the sobering facts behind the real estate bubble.  After a pe-
riod of flat rates of homeownership, homeownership did increase 
from around 60% in the early 1990s to more than 65% by 2000.70  
Home mortgage debt increased too.71  As the real estate price bubble 
increased home equity, households converted this (unrealized) home 
equity gain into liquidity by pledging their unrealized equity as col-
lateral in refinancing and equity lines of credit.72  At the same time, 
 
to explain racialized construction of street crime in response to economic insecu-
rity). 
 69 This statement by a political action group that advocates for middle- and work-
ing-class families is an example of a moral theory of financial loss: 
Corporate scandals have taken money directly out of the pockets  
of millions of Americans. The Institute for America’s Future has  
found that individual retirement accounts have lost over $175 billion.  
American Family Voices has determined that public pension funds 
across America have lost at least $6.4 billion.  And over one million 
workers have lost their jobs as their looted companies tumbled into 
bankruptcy. . . . While all this went on, company insiders cashed in. . . . 
No wonder that working families are saying that enough is enough: we 
can do better. 
See American Family Voices, Corporate Recklessness Report, http://www. 
americanfamilyvoices.org/pdf/cost.pdf (on file with Author).  The website says that 
the purpose of American Family Voices is to be “a strong voice for middle and low 
income families on economic, health care, and consumer issues.”  Id. 
 70 See Wenli Li, Moving Up: Trends in Homeownership and Mortgage Indebtedness, BUS. 
REV. (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila.), 1st Q. 2005, at 28, available at www.phil.frb.org/ 
files/br/brq105wl.pdf (analyzing home ownership and financing trends using con-
sumer and banking data). 
 71 Id. 
 72 For example, in 2003, homeowners liquidated $312 billion in equity through 
refinancing and equity lines of credit.  See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
FDIC Outlook: In Focus This Quarter: The U.S. Consumer Sector, http://www.fdic. 
gov/bank/analytical/regional/ro20044q/na/2004winter_01.html (scroll to “House-
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the subprime mortgage market grew from $35 billion in 1994 to $140 
billion in 2001.73 
The net result of these trends in homeownership, refinancing, 
and equity draws is that during the last thirty years, U.S. homeowners’ 
equity has actually dropped from 68.3% to 55%.74  Of course, financ-
ing consumption has become more expensive as the cost of living has 
increased, seen most dramatically in the 350% increase between 1977 
and 1998 in health insurance rates.75  During this same period aver-
age household income went up just 17%.76  Not surprisingly, foreclo-
sure rates on single-family homes have increased nine-fold since the 
1950s and threefold since the 1980s.77  It would seem that economic 
insecurity is a staple of many U.S. households, despite the nominal 
bubble in asset prices.78 
 
holds Use Home Equity to Increase Cash Flow”) (summarizing trends in economic 
indicators reflecting consumer income, wealth, and consumption). 
 73 Mortgage indebtedness is measured with a loan-to-value ratio that compares 
the amount of the loan with the value of the property.  See generally FRANK FABOZZI & 
DESSA FABOZZI, THE HANDBOOK OF FIXED INCOME SECURITIES 485 (4th ed. 1995). The 
higher the ratio—i.e., the greater the amount of the loan to the property being fi-
nanced—the greater the degree of the borrower’s leverage.  The median loan-to-
value ratio for mortgage indebtedness rose from 15% in 1984 to over 35% in 2001.  
Li, supra note 70, at 32. 
 74 See Javier Silva, A House of Cards: Refinancing the American Dream, DEMOS, Jan. 9, 
2005, http://www.demos.org/pubs/AHouseofCards.pdf (concluding that much of 
the cash flow from refinancing and equity lines of credit obtained between 2001 and 
2003 went to cover living expenses and pay down consumer credit).  Demos is a pub-
lic policy institute that studies economic insecurity and advocates for interventions to 
reduce it.  See Demos - A Network for Ideas & Action, About Demos, http://www. 
demos.org/page2.cfm (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). 
 75 John S. James, Institute of Medicine Calls for Universal Health Insurance by 2010, 
AIDS TREATMENT NEWS, Jan. 15, 2004, http://www.aidsnews.org/2004/01/IOM.html. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See Peter J. Elmer & Steven A. Seelig, The Rising Long-Term Trend of Single-Family 
Mortgage Foreclosure Rates 2 (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Working Paper No. 98-2, 1998), 
available at www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/working/98-2.pdf.  Foreclosures increase 
the risk of crime and other socially disruptive activity.  See Dan Immergluck & Geoff 
Smith, The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime 
(Jan. 31, 2005) (conference paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2005_conf_paper_session1_immergluck.pd
f; see also Michael Powell, A Bane Amid the Housing Boom: Rising Foreclosures, WASH. 
POST, May 30, 2005, at A1 (noting recent increases in foreclosure rates in forty-seven 
states, observing the disproportionate amount of foreclosures on lower-income 
homeowners, and asking whether federal home ownership initiatives are hurting 
rather than helping this community). 
 78 Financial innovation may significantly increase the fragility of firms.  See 
Pouncy, supra note 2, at 566.  One approach to reducing the economic insecurity 
imposed on others by this type of firm fragility is to build in limits to financial inno-
vation to reduce the potential social costs of failure.  Taking a different tack, my ap-
proach sees the regulation of financial risk-taking as a separate field from the human 
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Against this background of ambient economic insecurity, the 
narrative about rogue officers who robbed workers of their life sav-
ings is poignant but no less misleading for being so.  An explanation 
of these financial losses in terms of individual misconduct misses the 
point.  After all, it was the same accounting and business practices 
here repudiated that had created much of the wealth and many of 
the jobs whose evaporation had triggered the financial moral panic in 
the first place.79  In fact, Enron, in particular, had become a poster 
firm for “best practices” in financial engineering, associated with the 
production of financial wealth.80  This poignant narrative about inves-
 
services regulation needed to provide a safety net for investors when firms come 
apart.  The recommendations made in this Article do nothing to reduce the struc-
tural condition of economic insecurity.  Rather, these recommendations suggest that 
financial reports ought to more fully express the natural volatility involved in capital 
investment instead of airbrushing risk out of financial reports.  Sobering annual re-
ports may better pierce investment euphoria than those currently allowed under fi-
nancial reporting.  Identifying the regulatory provisions—i.e., Social Security, educa-
tion, unemployment insurance, housing benefits—to insulate vulnerable persons 
from the social costs of financial innovation is beyond the scope of this Article.  
However, for these recommendations to contribute more to vulnerable constituen-
cies, provisioning for the social costs is essential. 
 79 No doubt, it produces cognitive dissonance to admit that one may owe her 
employment security to questionable accounting practices: 
     Earnings management distorts the allocation of resources in the 
economy, especially in periods of high financial valuations.  When hir-
ing and investment decisions are observable [in the market], bad man-
agers hire and invest too much in order to mimic good managers.  
When they are caught and forced to restate, their firms shrink quickly. 
Simi Kedia & Thomas Philippon, The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting 23 (Nat’l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11573, 2005), available at http://pages. 
stern.nyu.edu/~tphilipp/papers/sktp.pdf.  See also Daniel Gross, The Crime: Slow Job 
Growth.  A Suspect: Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, § 3, at 3 (suggesting that aggres-
sive earnings management explained much of the job growth in recent years).  In a 
similar vein, when students in my class complain about receiving a grade they feel is 
lower than deserved I am tempted to ask whether they also complain when receiving 
an examination grade they feel is higher than they deserve.  So far I have resisted the 
temptation. 
 80 One commentator who put the Enron question into a market structure per-
spective noted that: 
     This story is not, however, simply about moral hazard, or a few bad 
agents, but rather about the general evolution of the practices used to 
define the rights to income derived from the productive assets of cor-
porations . . . . As a leading innovator in its field, pressing into the gray 
areas of corporate practice to more aggressively engineer its financial 
structures, Enron provides a convenient case of best practice in modern 
industrial evolution.  In light of its bankruptcy this may seem unusual, 
but it should be remembered that the practices which led to its col-
lapse had previously been praised as visionary. 
Eric Hake, Financial Illusion: Accounting for Profits in an Enron World, 39 J. ECON. ISSUES 
595, 596–97 (2005) (emphases added). 
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tor and worker losses also reflects a common misconception about 
the nature of unrealized appreciation in financial assets.  Again, most 
of what Enron employees lost was unrealized value, which, for exam-
ple, the federal income tax laws do not tax as income.81  Evoking tulip 
bulbs, Enron reminded us of the ephemeral nature of unrealized 
gain, striking a chord since such gain makes up much of our wealth.82  
Would a retirement based on unrealized appreciation in corporate 
equities be rosy?  Maybe not, given the nature of market risk.  John 
Kenneth Galbraith argues that during a price bubble, a collective 
psychology built on denial of financial realities sets in with investors.83  
The psychology leads to financial speculation and concomitant disas-
ter.84  Financial moral panic is a defense mechanism of this mind set.  
More specifically, my point is that panics of this type deny the un-
avoidable underlying volatility of financial assets, of which capital 
market investment is simply the most popular example.85  Moreover, 
although framed in terms of class injury to Enron workers who lost 
unrealized value, the class discourse around the corporate scandals 
silenced other more fundamental phrasings of the economic insecu-
rity in question.86  Queen for a day or investor for life—how salient is 
the difference for many?87 
 
 81 The inability or unwillingness to distinguish between the loss of unrealized 
value and cash losses occurred throughout the hearings.  See, e.g., HEARINGS, supra 
note 55, at 3–4 (statement of Sen. Richard C. Shelby) (“Unfortunately, Enron is only 
the tip of the iceberg.  Some experts have estimated that investors lost over $200 bil-
lion over the last 6 years due to earnings restatements and to lost market capitaliza-
tion following audit failures.”); Id. at 7 (statement of Sen. Debbie Stabenow ) (“In 
fact, in Michigan, the Genessee County Employees Pension Fund lost $370,000 on 
Enron’s fall, and I know that there were hundreds of thousands of dollars that were 
lost in other pension funds, not to mention the employees who lost their life sav-
ings.”). 
 82 In the 17th century, Holland was seized with a speculative investment fever 
over tulips, leading to a major financial crisis there.  See CHARLES KINDLEBERGER, 
MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISIS 109–11 (2000).  The tu-
lip has become the official flower of financial historians. 
 83 See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, A SHORT HISTORY OF FINANCIAL EUPHORIA 1–17 
(1993) (arguing that collective psychological mechanisms contribute to financial cri-
ses by, inter alia, discouraging criticism of financial speculation). 
 84 This psychology is the collective behavioral expression of the financial instabil-
ity some scholars cite as a cause of financial innovation.  See Pouncy, supra note 2, at 
566–67 (analyzing Minsky’s financial instability thesis that cyclical fragility in the fi-
nance sector leads to financial innovation).  Bounded rationality en masse like this 
should give us pause when wondering about privatizing Social Security. 
 85 Airbrushed financial statements help to lull investors into this mindset. 
 86 E.M. Forster evokes this silenced constituency when introducing Leonard Bast, 
the protagonist in Howard’s End, a class novel set in Edwardian England: 
     We are not concerned with the very poor.  They are unthinkable 
and only to be approached by the statistician or the poet.  This story 
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When deviants are singled out to bear the blame for structural 
problems this way, it is the Left which turns to moral panic analysis to 
contest the moral framing of the problem.88  While used by the sex 
Left, the penological Left, and the racial Left to address conventional 
deviancy,89 moral panic analysis has not been deployed by legal schol-
ars to parse finance law.  This is another expression of the tendency 
in contemporary legal scholarship to match particular critical meth-
 
deals with gentlefolk, or with those who are obliged to pretend that 
they are gentlefolk. 
     The boy, Leonard Bast, stood at the extreme verge of gentility.  He 
was not in the abyss, but he could see it, and at times people whom he 
knew had dropped in, and counted no more.  He knew that he was 
poor, and would admit it; he would have died sooner than confess any 
inferiority to the rich.  This may be splendid of him.  But he was infe-
rior to most rich people, there is not the least doubt of it.  He was not 
as courteous as the average rich man, nor as intelligent, nor as healthy, 
nor as lovable.  His mind and his body had been alike underfed, be-
cause he was poor, and because he was modern they were always crav-
ing better food.  Had he lived some centuries ago, in the brightly col-
oured civilizations of the past, he would have had a definite status, his 
rank and his income would have corresponded.  But in his day the an-
gel of Democracy had arisen, enshadowing the classes with leathern 
wings, and proclaiming, ‘All men are equal—all men, that is to say, who 
possess umbrellas,’ and so he was obliged to assert gentility, lest he 
slipped [sic] into the abyss where nothing counts, and the statements 
of Democracy are inaudible. 
E.M. FORSTER, HOWARD’S END 38–39 (Penguin Books 2000) (describing class con-
sciousness in Edwardian England linked to an estate, Howard’s End). 
 87 Queen for a Day was a popular 1950s “sob show” in which working-class women 
competed for having the most economically miserable life, as determined by an au-
dience applause meter.  The winning Cinderella would receive prizes and weep while 
being crowned and robed.  As its producer noted, “Sure ‘Queen’ was vulgar and 
sleazy and filled with bathos and bad taste. . . . That was why it was so successful.  It 
was exactly what the general public wanted. . . . And the TV audience cried their eyes 
out, morbidly delighted to find there were people worse off than they were, and so 
they got what they were after.”  MAXENE FABE, TV GAME SHOWS 120–30 (1979) 
(quoted in Shawn Hanley, Queen for a Day (Dec. 16, 1996) (unpublished manu-
script, available at http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/projects/hanley/queen.html) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 88 See COHEN, supra note 34, at xxxi: 
It is obviously true that the uses of the concept to expose dispropor-
tionality and exaggeration have come from a left liberal consensus.  
This empirical project is concentrated on (if not reserved for) cases 
where the moral outrage appears driven by conservative or reactionary 
forces.  For cultural liberals (today’s ‘cosmopolitans’), this was an op-
portunity to condemn moral entrepreneurs, to sneer at their small-
mindedness, puritanism or intolerance; for political radicals, these 
were easy targets, the soft side of hegemony or elite interests. 
Id. 
 89 See supra notes 38–44 (see cited legal scholarship applying moral panic analysis 
to the social control of conventional folk devils). 
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ods with substantive political projects, thereby freezing the movement 
of a critical style across ideological camps.90  Moral panic analysis has, 
however, no natural affinity with either the Left or the Right, given 
that mobs can form anywhere along the political spectrum.  So, moral 
panic analysis may critique statutes which favor interests anywhere 
along the majoritarian spectrum.  As in any panic, a financial moral 
panic is another opportunity to consider the social construction of 
deviancy, although the folk devils in question may not belong to the 
usual suspects.91  To the extent that it challenges popular legislation, 
 
 90 See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Mi-
croanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1398–1403 (1996) (noting the his-
toric divide between critical approaches such as law and economics and outsider ju-
risprudence).  Rubin notes that there is no intrinsic antagonism between—in this 
case—law and economics and alterity jurisprudence: 
An obvious explanation is the divergent political predilections that 
gave rise to each movement, but the correspondence between their po-
litical positions and their methodologies is not logically required.  That 
is, economic analysis is not necessarily the exclusive instrument of the 
political right, nor deconstruction the instrument of the left; political 
debate could have been carried out within either methodological 
framework. 
Id. at 1401–02.  He looks to scholarship (as do I) as a place where academics can in-
tegrate methodologies without the bondage of history: 
In fact, it is remarkable how disconnected the two movements are, 
given that they have developed in the same academic institutions, pub-
lished in the same scholarly journals, and shared a common concern 
with law and legal institutions. 
     . . . Because any synthesis of these movements is likely to occur at 
the level of scholarly discourse, and not at the level of substantive po-
litical positions, real possibilities for synthesis emerge primarily in this 
methodological realm. 
Id. at 1412.  I tried doing so in Sending the Right Signals: Using Rent-Seeking Theory to 
Analyze the Cuban Central Bank, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 483, 484–525 (2005) (“Identifying 
the governance structure of rent-seeking deals between central banks and their con-
stituencies shows how private creditor interests impact the workings of financial regu-
lations.  To that end, using opportunism to model institutional and individual action 
makes [critical] theory more relevant, especially that of liberals, progressives, and 
deconstructionists on the left (island [Cuba], diaspora, and elsewhere).”). 
 91 Pointing out the social construction of financial elites as deviants does not sug-
gest that all folk devils suffer equally.  We know that they do not.  The sociology of 
law makes clear that governmental social control is regressive, falling most heavily on 
the most socially and economically marginalized.  See DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR 
OF LAW 16–30 (1976) (expressing law as a series of postulates that describe the inci-
dence of social control).  Nor do I suggest that the financiers convicted during this 
round-up had not broken some law.  Given the pattern of prosecutorial retreat into 
obstruction of justice charges when the evidentiary burdens of substantive offenses 
were too high, the legal violations, however, may not have been of financial law.  
Even financial witch hunts, though, must conform to procedural requirements.  See 
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005) (unanimously revers-
ing prosecution on obstruction of justice charge due to defective jury instructions). 
GABILONDO FINAL.DOC 3/6/2006  4:42:16 PM 
806 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:781 
effective moral panic analysis is coherently (and persuasively, I think) 
anti-democratic.   
But where was the economic Left to object to the ideological 
framing of the corporate scandals?  Students of constitutional law 
should be aware of the historic role of federal courts in silencing 
proponents of Left-based radical approaches to economic insecurity.92  
The ongoing effect of this silencing is that the United States—unlike 
many other industrialized economies—lacks a robust economic Left 
from which to frame economic questions in more explicitly structural 
terms, an ironic market failure in the marketplace of ideas.93  Also, 
the otherwise left-leaning moral panic analysts may object less when it 
is financiers who fall prey to social stigma.94 
In the absence of any meaningful opposition to the blame narra-
tive, Congress acted accordingly.  Since the evil calling for Congress’s 
attention was framed as mischief by officials and auditors, the Act 
ended up with a punitive rather than technical focus.  The traditional 
focus of federal securities law is disclosure.95  However, only three of 
 
 92 Indeed, the American judicial campaign against the economic left has been 
singularly effective.  See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (conviction 
for political organizing on behalf of the Communist Party); Abrams v. United States, 
250 U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding conviction of anarchists); Debs v. United States, 249 
U.S. 211 (1919) (convicting Eugene Debs for anti-war speech made after a strong 
1916 run for President).  
 93 Today one can speak of the economic Left in the United States only apocry-
phally because, in terms of institutionalized economic views, our system has only a 
party of the center, a party of the right, and elements of the far right.  To invoke “the 
left,” therefore, without explicit qualification is to move the political spectrum right-
ward.  See Matt Bai, The Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 17, 2005, at 38 (profiling 
Professor George Lakoff, who studies how framing of political issues affects the effi-
cacy of political advocacy).  For a prominent counterexample that attempts to insti-
tutionalize a Left perspective in the legal academy, see generally LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT 
CRITIQUE (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
 94 Brown and Halley note that a willingness to consider radical uncertainty is an 
essential part of critique.  Applying financial moral analysis to discourses purporting 
to address distributional problems is part of a richer critique of economic life: 
For part of what it means to dissect the discursive practices that organ-
ize our lives is to embark on an inquiry whose outcome is unknown, 
and the process of which will be radically disorienting at times. . . . In-
deed, one of our worries about legalism pertains to its impulse to call 
the question too peremptorily. . . . It was through the process of subject-
ing political and philosophical idealism to critique that Marx found his 
way to dialectical materialism and political economy, but a careful 
reading of this early work makes clear that Marx did not know in ad-
vance where his critiques would take him . . . . 
LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 93, at 27. 
 95 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 740 (4th ed. 2002) 
(stating that “federal securities law’s exclusive focus is on full disclosure”). 
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Sarbanes-Oxley’s sixty-six substantive provisions address disclosure.96  
Instead, criminalizing corporate and managerial activity is the over-
riding purpose of the Act; three titles are dedicated to fraud and 
criminal penalties.97  Targeting folk devils, the Act increased the li-
ability of the chief financial officer (CFO) by requiring the CFO to 
attest to the accuracy of periodic reports under pain of criminal 
prosecution.98  Moreover, by setting up the Public Company Account-
ing Oversight Board, the Act puts auditors squarely in the sights of 
the SEC, now empowered to increase its criminal and disciplinary ac-
 
 96 In addition to the rule discussed here, Sarbanes-Oxley amended the previous 
requirement that certain individuals with controlling interests in a registrant disclose 
change in control transactions involving the firm.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (2000 & 
Supp. II 2002).  Also, the law charged the SEC with rulemaking to ensure that regis-
trants disclose whether audit committees include anyone who is a financial expert.  
See id. § 7265 (Supp. II 2002).  The law does provide for additional review of regis-
trant disclosures by SEC staff, but the section does not impose a new disclosure re-
quirement.  See id. § 7266 (Supp. II 2002). 
 97 See Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002 § 802, Pub. L. 
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 800 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519–20 (Supp. II 2002)) (Title 
VIII of Sarbanes-Oxley); White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002  
§ 903, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 805 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000 & 
Supp.)) (Title IX of Sarbanes-Oxley); and Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 
2002 § 1102, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 807 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2000 & 
Supp. II 2002)) (Title XI of Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 98 For example, the Act requires the CFO to attest to the accuracy of the firm’s 
financial reports.  15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(2)–(3) (Supp. II 2002).  It requires that: 
the principal financial officer or officers, or persons performing similar 
functions, certify in each annual or quarterly report filed or submitted 
under either such section of such Act that— 
     . . . . 
     (2) based on the officer’s knowledge, the report does not contain 
any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circum-
stances under which such statements were made, not misleading; . . . 
     (3) based on such officer’s knowledge, the financial statements, and 
other financial information included in the report, fairly present in all 
material respects the financial condition and results of operations of 
the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in the report . . . . 
Id.  Failure to comply with the attestation requirement exposes a chief financial offi-
cer to imprisonment for up to 20 years and fines of up to $5 million.  18 U.S.C.  
§ 1350 (Supp. II 2002).  The new requirements extend the chief financial officer’s 
previous duty to ensure the accuracy of financial reports.  See Joseph F. Morrissey, 
Catching the Culprits: Is Sarbanes-Oxley Enough?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801, 841–44 
(pointing out that chief financial officers and chief executive officers already had to 
attest to the accuracy of financial reports under securities law requirements that pre-
dated Sarbanes-Oxley); Marie Leone, Command and Controllers: Sarbanes-Oxley May 
Bring New Risks to the CFO’s Office, But It’s Raising the Profile of the Once-Faceless Company 
Controller, CFO.COM, July 14, 2003, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3009814/ 
c_3036076?origin=archive (considering alternative reporting structures in the firm to 
comply with the CFO’s new statutory liabilities). 
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tion over a profession that had previously been largely self-
regulated.99  Again, this emphasis on individual criminality reflects 
the influence of moral panic in the legislative process.  Consistent 
with the national mood, financiers convicted in related prosecutions 
have received heavy sentences, in particular the contumaciously in-
transigent ones who refused to plea bargain.100  Other prosecutions 
and civil actions brought against corporate officials have also tried to 
expand the concept of financial loss beyond the previous legal defini-
tion.101  Constructing the problem in question in terms of corporate 
 
 99 Cf. Richard I. Miller & Michael R. Young, Financial Reporting and Risk Manage-
ment in the 21st Century, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2010–17 (1997) (showing how 
computer-based financial reporting creates new liabilities and defenses for auditors). 
 100 See 3 Sentenced for Enron Deal, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2005, at C12 (noting three-
year and ten-month sentence of Enron finance official Boyle and three-year and one-
month sentences of Merrill Lynch bankers Furst and Fuhs in earnings management 
transaction); Associated Press, Adelphia Founder Gets 15-Year Term; Son Gets 20, 
MSNBC.COM, June 20, 2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8291040/ (discussing fif-
teen-year prison sentence of John Rigas and twenty-year sentence of son, Timothy 
Rigas, for securities fraud involving use of cash management systems and nondisclo-
sure of OBS transactions); Associated Press, Ex-Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski Found 
Guilty, MSNBC.COM, June 17, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8258729 (not-
ing that Kozlowski and his former finance chief Swartz face up to thirty years in 
prison); Federal Judge Imposes Harsh Prison Sentence on Defendant Convicted After Testifying 
in His Own Defense, WHITE COLLAR CRIME ALERT (Blank Rome LLP), Oct. 2005, 
http://www.blankrome.com/Publications/whitecollar/WhiteCollar1004-6.pdf (sug-
gesting a tendency of judges to impose increased punishment on defendants who 
testify on their own behalf and are later convicted); Mary Flood, 2 Enron Case Figures 
Avoid Long Jail Terms, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 22, 2005, at A1 (noting three-year and 
ten-month prison sentence of Merrill Lynch banking and finance staff Brown and 
Bayly); Bruce Nichols, For Former Dynegy Exec, Prison Takes Turn for Worse, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 31, 2005, at 4A (discussing transfer of Dynegy trader Jamie Olis 
to medium-security prison based on his twenty-four-year sentence for a complex cash 
flow arrangement that mischaracterized financing cash flow as operating cash flow); 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ex-Banking Star Given 18 Months for Obstruction, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
9, 2004, at A1 (discussing eighteen-month prison sentence of Frank Quattrone for 
obstruction of justice); Stephen Taub, Rite Aid Exec, 76, Gets 10 Years in Prison, 
CFO.COM, Oct. 18, 2004, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3305191/c_3305215?f= 
archives&origin=archive  (discussing ten-year prison sentence for accounting fraud 
and obstruction of justice); see generally Determining the Reasonableness of an Upward De-
parture in a Fraud Case, White Collar Crime Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors. 
typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2005/06/upward_departur.html (June 18, 
2005) (discussing United States v. Meeker, 411 F.3d 736 (6th Cir. 2005), which departed 
from the fifty-one to sixty-three month prison sentence for investment fraud under 
the Sentencing Guidelines to impose an eighty-four-month sentence based on thirty 
letters from victims, twenty-six of which were not disclosed to the defendant). 
 101 See, e.g., Memorandum of Amicus Curiae United States Chamber of Commerce 
Concerning Interpretation of “Loss,” United States v. Bayly, CR. No. H-03-363 (S.D. 
Tex. Mar. 25, 2005) (arguing that common law and civil securities law standard for 
loss should control the construction of “loss” under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines), available at http://www.uschamber.com/nclc/caselist/issues/securities.htm 
(follow “View brief” hyperlink under “‘Loss Causation’ in Criminal Sentencing”).  
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rogues has also dovetailed with the SEC’s self-concept as an enforce-
ment agency, rather than as a knowledge center about capital market 
structure.102 
Granted, public floggings do deter misconduct, but they are not 
likely to solve the technical problems about financial reporting.103  
These problems continue.104  Part IV offers technical recommenda-
tions for these problems which would contribute to financial trans-
parency for lay investors.105  But, first, I must address some of the 
 
Securities law does recognize a civil action for unrealized loss, but only if the disclo-
sure of the misrepresentation caused the loss.  15 U.S.C. § 77l(b) (2000 & Supp. II 
2002) (allowing an action for loss measured as “the depreciation in value of the . . . 
security” resulting from a misrepresentation). 
 102 Consider the emphasis on enforcement from the SEC’s website discussion on 
institutional mission: “Crucial to the SEC’s effectiveness . . . is its enforcement au-
thority.  Each year the SEC brings hundreds of civil enforcement actions against in-
dividuals and companies for violations of the securities laws.”  U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission, How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, 
and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last 
visisted March 2, 2006).  Later I urge the SEC to reconsider its self-concept more in 
terms of regulatory intelligence about capital market structure.  See infra notes 262–
80 and accompanying text, suggesting the formation of a capital structure surveil-
lance unit at the SEC to supplement and inform enlightened enforcement of the se-
curities laws. 
 103 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
is supposed to fix the system and force accountants to be policeman in 
their audits.  Does anyone seriously believe that this board will be able 
to monitor the auditing of thousands of public companies to assure 
that accountants are acting as policemen, rather than accountants?  Of 
course it cannot, but investors are still being deceived into believing 
that it will.  The Enron debacle and the telecom and dotcom implo-
sions, as well as continuing scandals, by now should have removed any 
doubts as to the hollowness of the assurance that full disclosure pro-
tects investors.  That was an impossible dream, and Sarbanes-Oxley 
only adds more smoke to this vision. 
Markham, supra note 9, at 799. 
 104 See William H. Beaver, What Have We Learned from the Recent Corporate Scandals 
That We Did Not Already Know?, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 155, 163 (2002) (analyzing 
corporate scandals in the context of capital markets research on financial reporting 
discretion).  Professor Beaver notes how the emotional climate of the corporate 
scandal has impeded a more technical approach to the issues:  
     At this stage, there has been a great deal of rhetoric and outrage but 
relatively little analysis.  There has been pressure for rapid responses in 
the absence of fully understanding the causes of the problems and how 
they are linked to structural defects in the financial reporting-
corporate governance environment.  Without these links, it is possible 
that, in spite of an increase in legislation and regulation, the same 
problems will reappear. 
Id. at 168.  See also Partnoy, supra note 18, at 1264 for a concurrence. 
 105 See infra notes 245–80 and accompanying text. 
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technical dynamics behind the hazy moral construction outlined in 
the previous Part. 
II. FROM MORALIZING TO FINANCIAL TRUTH: CORRECTING THE 
MYOPIA OF THE BALANCE SHEET 
Many of the losses which triggered the financial moral panic in-
volved the failure to disclose significant OBS liabilities and the re-
lated failure to book loan income as such, rather than as operating 
cash flow.  In other words, neither the balance sheets of these firms 
nor their statements of cash flows adequately reflected the firms’ true 
capital structure.  Understanding why this gap developed requires 
appreciating the appeal of OBS arrangements to managers, who 
gravitate to the OBS sector for both fiduciary and self-serving rea-
sons.106  Using examples of the cash flow games played by Enron and 
Dynegy, below I explain why a disclosure standard based on effective 
capital structure would result in more transparency about a firm’s 
risk. 
A. The Discrete Charm of Off-Balance-Sheet Arrangements 
The balance sheet is supposed to be a point-in-time snapshot of 
a firm’s net worth and capital structure, i.e., the mixture of the debt 
and equity instruments that finance the firm.  Net worth is calculated 
by netting the reporting firm’s claims to value against the claims of 
others on the firm.107  The balance sheet “recognizes” these claims by 
estimating their total value and aggregating like claims into analyti-
cally unified categories of asset claims, liability claims, and equity 
claims.108  Shown on the left side of the balance sheet, “Assets” are the 
firm’s claims on others.  These claims are listed by declining liquid-
ity.109  Shown at the top of the right side of the balance sheet, “Liabili-
 
 106 For a sophisticated but friendly explanation of the balance sheet, see Walter 
Schuetze, What are Assets and Liabilities? Where is True North? (Accounting that My Sister 
Would Understand), 37 ABACUS J. ACCT., FIN. & BUS. STUD. (2001) (emphasizing that 
balance sheet values should be based on cash or cash-equivalent values). 
 107 See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
CONCEPTS NO. 6: ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (1985), available at http://www. 
fasb.org/pdf/con6.pdf. 
 108 In accounting, “recognition” means reporting the value of an item in a finan-
cial report.  See THOMAS R. DYCKMAN ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 36 (5th ed. 
2001).  Mandatory recognition is more invasive than mere disclosure.  The new dis-
closure rule requires only disclosure, not recognition. 
 109 Accounting definitions sound somewhat metaphysical.  “Assets are probable 
future economic benefits obtained or controlled by a particular entity as a result of 
past transactions or events.”  STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 6, 
supra note 107, at 6.  Asset claims may be choses in possession, i.e., an asset claim may 
GABILONDO FINAL.DOC 3/6/2006  4:42:16 PM 
2006] FINANCIAL MORAL PANIC 811 
ties” are third parties’ credit claims on the firm.  They are listed by 
maturity and relative priority.110  The difference between “Assets” and 
“Liabilities” is called “Shareholder’s Equity” and appears under the 
“Liabilities” section in the right-hand column.111  The owners’ ac-
count, shareholder’s equity is the residue that would be left for the 
firm’s owners in a hypothetical liquidation after satisfaction of credi-
tors’ claims.112  By convention, the “Assets” equals the sum of the “Li-
abilities” and “Equity” accounts.113  The firm’s balance sheet also in-
cludes the assets and liabilities of any other entity controlled by the 
firm.114  Most registrants use the annual 10K form filed with the SEC 
as their balance sheet. 
 
be a building, or, more commonly, choses in action, such as a debt obligation against 
another, requiring further action to reduce the chose to a liquid form.  Liquidity 
when used with regard to an asset claim—rather than to an obligor as a whole—
means the ease with which the asset may be converted into cash or its equivalent.  See 
generally LIQUIDITY: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 9–13. 
 110 “Liabilities are probable future sacrifices of economic benefits arising from 
present obligations of a particular entity to transfer assets or provide services to other 
entities in the future as a result of past transactions or events.”  See STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 6, supra note 107, at 6.  Liability entries should 
also tell a reader something about a firm’s funding style.  Does the firm issue long- or 
short-term debt?  Will its payment obligations mature over time or all at once?  The 
answers to these questions help a reader appreciate the funding philosophy of the 
firm. 
 111 “Equity . . . is the residual interest in the assets of an entity that remains after 
deducting its liabilities.”  Id.  The real value of asset and liability claims is unclear be-
cause neither is marked-to-market to reflect liquidation value.  Most firms value assets 
at historic cost rather than replacement cost.  Firms book liabilities at par, i.e., nomi-
nal, value rather than reflecting what creditors would accept to settle the claim 
(which would be a mark-to-market approach to liabilities).  So the value of Share-
holders’ Equity is intrinsically variable. 
 112 In truth, though, the varieties of accounting methods used by the balance 
sheet make it hard to estimate a firm’s actual liquidation value without more detail 
about assets and liabilities. 
The accounting and reporting model under Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles is actually a mixed-attribute model.  Although most 
transactions and balances are measured on the basis of historical cost, 
which is the amount of cash or its equivalent originally paid to acquire 
an asset, certain assets and liabilities are reported at current values ei-
ther in the financial statements or related notes.  For example, certain 
investments in debt and equity securities are currently reported at fair 
value, receivables are reported at net realizable value, and inventories 
are reported at the lower of cost or market value. 
See HEARINGS, supra note 55, at 561 n.13 (prepared statement of David M. Walker, 
Comptroller General of the United States, General Accounting Office). 
 113 This is called the fundamental accounting equation.  PAUL D. KIMMEL ET AL., 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 12 (1998). 
 114 Part of the OBS sector had started with an early accounting pronouncement 
that clarified when a firm had to consolidate legally separate entities on its balance 
sheet.  AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN 
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The numbers on the balance sheet matter dearly.  If they hint at 
illiquidity or capital shortfalls, the firm may have to pay more for 
credit, face the white-hot glare of regulators, or trigger adverse con-
tractual rights of demanding counterparties.  For example, some 
credit covenants let a creditor sue if the borrowing firm’s (balance 
sheet) debt to equity ratio drops below a contractually-set point.115  To 
mitigate these business risks, the careful manager optimizes the pres-
entation of information on the balance sheet.  For example, firms 
may reclassify debt from short-term to long-term in order to improve 
their liquidity ratios.116  Shifting numerical values only in the assets 
column (left-hand side), only in the liabilities column (right-hand 
side), or only between the liability and the equity accounts (both on 
the right-hand side) does not change the overall size of the balance 
sheet.117  To modify the size of the visible balance sheet, managers 
must move off the balance sheet, using reporting discretion which is 
customary in accrual accounting.118  For example, the classification of 
operating leases is subject to significant discretion.119  The generalized 
 
NO. 51: CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (1959) (requiring consolidation of a 
legally separate entity when the reporting firm had a controlling financial interest, 
including majority voting interest).  Consolidation eliminates the risk of surprise 
from an OBS item because the reporting firm absorbs the OBS entity for reporting 
purposes.  The issues presented in this discussion arise with respect to unconsolidated 
entities. 
 115 See ILEEN B. MALITZ, THE MODERN ROLE OF BOND COVENANTS 15–26 (describing 
bond covenants creditors use to limit wealth expropriation by owners and manag-
ers). 
 116 See Jeffrey Gramlich et al., Balance Sheet Management: The Case of Short-Term Obli-
gations Reclassified as Long-Term Debt, 39 J. ACCT. RES. 283 (2001) (documenting sig-
nificant debt reclassifications of 220 firms to smooth out balance sheet liquidity and 
leverage measures). 
 117 None of these moves disturbs the basic stability of the fundamental accounting 
equation that “Assets” equals the sum of “Liabilities” plus “Equity.” 
 118 A prominent accounting theorist notes: 
The term used in the research literature is earnings management, rather 
than some pejorative phrase, such as earnings manipulation. . . . Discre-
tion in financial reporting can be used to signal or convey additional 
information management has that is not publicly available.  Hence, it 
may be benign rather than sinister . . . earnings management does not 
necessarily imply a violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Princi-
ples (GAAP).  There is a range of discretion within the boundaries of 
judgment that is permitted, in fact required, under GAAP-based ac-
crual accounting. 
See BEAVER, supra note 5, at 163. 
 119 Booked off-the-balance sheet, the lease shows up in neither the asset or liability 
column.  But recognizing the item on the balance sheet increases book assets by the 
value of the item and book liabilities by debt in respect of the lease.  Constructive 
capitalization better reflects a firm’s effective capital structure.  See Eugene A. Imhoff 
et al., Operating Leases: Impact of Constructive Capitalization, ACCOUNTING HORIZONS, 
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practice of funding with OBS items leads finance practitioners to dis-
tinguish between a firm’s “book leverage” and its “financial lever-
age.”120  Some arrangements are hard to classify as on- or off-balance-
sheet.121 
Managers may seek shelter from balance sheet disclosure both 
for fiduciary and opportunistic reasons.122  Conducting a transaction 
 
Mar. 1991, at 51 (showing effects on net income and balance sheet of constructively 
capitalizing unrecorded operating leases).  The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion estimates that U.S. corporate issuers may owe as much as $1.25 trillion in non-
cancelable OBS operating leases.  See SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 4. 
 120 A fundamental aspect of capital structure, leverage is the ratio of debt financ-
ing to equity financing; in other words the extent to which owners use creditors’ re-
sources to increase the firm’s operating base and the owners’ residual upside gain.  
Financial accounting calculates “book” leverage with generally accepted accounting 
principles.  A more economic observer measures the firm’s effective leverage (also 
called financial leverage) on the basis of actual financial power.  Obviously, book and 
financial leverage diverge.  Finance classes teach students about financial leverage.  
See RAY H. GARRISON ET AL., MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING 796-97 (11th ed. 2006). 
 121 The treatment of leases is a good example of how items with potential OBS 
implications were treated.  The problem with a lease is that it may be a true lease or, 
instead, a disguised property interest that belongs on the balance sheet.  Between 
1939 and 1959, the main source of accounting rules was the AICPA’s Committee on 
Accounting Procedure, which produced Accounting Research Bulletins (ARB).  The 
AICPA first addressed lease accounting in 1949.  See AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. 
ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 38 (1949) [hereinafter ARB No. 
38] (superseded by AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 
BULLETIN NO. 43: RESTATEMENT AND REVISION OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS 
(1953)).  ARB No. 38 laid down only a loosely defined standard about the problem.  
Later lease accounting pronouncements refined these principles to increase the ac-
curacy of financial reporting with respect to leases.  Identifying when a lease had to 
be reflected on the balance sheet, i.e., capitalized, or could be located off the bal-
ance sheet remained a contentious issue for the next forty years.  See FIN. 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 13: 
ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES (1976) (clarifying when leases must be capitalized on the 
balance sheet); FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 23: INCEPTIONS OF THE LEASE (1978) (noting when capi-
talization must be done at the beginning of a lease); FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 91: ACCOUNTING FOR 
NONREFUNDABLE FEES AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH ORIGINATING OR ACQUIRING LOANS 
AND INITIAL DIRECT COSTS OF LEASES (1986) (identifying which costs need not be re-
flected on the balance sheet); and FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 98: ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES (1988).  The issue 
is still not definitively resolved. 
 122 It is no accident that these items are invisible.  Consider this comment on the 
OBS items targeted by the new disclosure rule: 
     The [OBS entities] that this interpretation covers are currently in-
visible, by design.  There is no simple or reliable way for analysts or in-
vestors to judge which companies are most likely to be affected.  Clues 
might be found in the management’s discussion and analysis, but not 
enough to enable financial statement users to reliably estimate how the 
interpretation will affect companies’ financial statements.  This new in-
terpretation might cause very few changes in corporate balance sheets, 
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off the balance sheet gives managers more flexibility by reducing the 
discipline of oversight from creditors or owners who would be able to 
monitor publicly-reported financial details.123  Common fiduciary mo-
tivations include managing the firm’s book leverage, credit rating, or 
risk profile for the sake of protecting the trading value of the firm’s 
shares.124  For example, an OBS deal may boost the firm’s book in-
come without worsening the firm’s book leverage.125  A firm may de-
duct the OBS debt interest from some special purpose entities on its 
federal taxes without having to report the underlying liability on its 
balance sheet.126  Firms also use OBS partnerships to optimize the tax 
value of their research and development expenditures.127  Segregating 
a business project off-balance-sheet insulates the firm from the risk of 
 
because companies that would have to consolidate their SPEs under 
the requirements of this interpretation might already be taking steps to 
shut down or sell their interests prior to the effective date.  This sce-
nario would avoid the embarrassment for the sponsors of presenting 
what they never professed to own.  The other alternative is that Inter-
pretation 46(R) might cause significant adverse adjustments to com-
panies’ balance sheets and create technical defaults in loan covenants. 
Jalal Soroosh & Jack T. Ciesielski, Accounting for Special Purpose Entities Revised: FASB 
Interpretation 46(R), CPA J., July 2004, at 30, 37, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/ 
cpajournal/2004/704/essentials/p30.htm. 
 123 In this sense, using OBS activities increases the value of a manager’s “switching 
options” to reallocate resources between investment.  Cf. George Triantis, Financial 
Slack Policy and the Laws of Secured Transactions, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 39, (2005) (“As a 
general proposition, managers are much more prone to take actions that increase 
their welfare (for example, perquisite consumption or empire building) or the wel-
fare of their shareholders (for example, share repurchases or high-risk investments) 
if they have cash at their disposal.”).  The disclosure recommendations made in Part 
IV may reduce the value of these options by providing more detail about cash flow to 
external constituencies of the firm.  See Part IV.A. 
 124 See generally William Beaver, Perspectives on Recent Capital Market Research, 77 
ACCT. REV. 453, 466–68 (2002) (concluding that it is difficult to isolate the primary 
motive for discretionary behavior by managers over reporting earnings because man-
agers have multiple motives for such conduct).  Cf. Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the 
Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The Book-Tax Accounting Conformity Defense, 2003 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35 (arguing that accounting practices should be conformed to 
tax standards to avoid characterizing transactions differently for tax and financial ac-
counting purposes). 
 125 See generally Fred D. Campobasso, Off-Balance-Sheet Financing Can Generate Capi-
tal for Strategic Development, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., June 2000, available at http:// 
www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3257/is_6_54/ai_62929196 (noting return 
and liquidity advantages to using synthetic leases, sale-and-leaseback, and joint ven-
ture arrangements to finance real estate operations). 
 126 See David Mangefrida & E. Ray Beeman, Recent IRS Securitization Ruling Signals 
Analytical Shift in Distinguishing Between Sales and Financings, INVESTMENT LAW., Oct. 
1998, at 5 (explaining ability to characterize the lease as sale or financing). 
 127 See generally Douglas Shackelford & Terry Shevlin, Empirical Tax Research in Ac-
counting, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 321 (2001); Terry Shevlin, Taxes and Off-Balance-Sheet 
Financing: Research and Development Limited Partnerships, 62 ACCT. REV. 480 (1987). 
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loss from the investment.  Stealth funding through OBS arrange-
ments may avoid covenants limiting investment in new business op-
portunities in bank loan documents, bondholder indenture agree-
ments, or a firm’s certificate of incorporation.128  Such deals may, 
however, violate explicit contractual duties of good faith and fair 
dealing.129 
Apart from fiduciary brinksmanship for the sake of shareholders, 
managers may also use an OBS arrangement for their own opportun-
istic ends, which may be antithetical to the interests of their princi-
pals, i.e. shareholders.  When executive compensation is pegged to 
balance sheet ratios such as return on assets, return on equity, and 
debt-to-equity, a manager would likely prefer, all else being equal, an 
OBS deal which increases his compensation by improving one of 
these ratios. 
Undisclosed OBS arrangements bear on conflicts between a 
firm’s competing claimants, including the stockholder-bondholder 
conflict over the firm’s exposure to financial risk.130  OBS cash flow 
 
 128 Cf. In re Explorer Pipeline Co., 781 A.2d 705 (Del. Ch. 2001) (holding that cor-
poration’s decision to enter into an OBS operating lease was not subject to a super-
majority provision found in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation); see also 
Samir El-Gazzar et al., The Use of Off-Balance Sheet Financing to Circumvent Financial 
Covenant Restrictions, 4 J. ACC. AUDITING FIN. 217 (1989) (analyzing forty-three ad-
denda to leases which contained debt covenants to examine how firms use OBS ar-
rangements to modify covenant-based restrictions). 
 129 For example, a court has been unwilling to expand the concept of good faith 
with respect to balance sheet debt.  See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 
F. Supp. 1504, 1507–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting plaintiff’s request to imply a cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing into a bond indenture which did not impose debt 
limits on the defendant-issuer).  The use of OBS debt, however, may warrant wider 
consideration for a creditor, although careful bond counsel would draft covenants 
taking into account the existence of OBS items. 
 130 Bondholders enjoy legal priority over stockholders to only a liquidated 
amount, i.e., the principal and interest on the bonds in question.  See MALITZ, supra 
note 115, at 3–4 (explaining the conflict of interest between creditors and owners of 
a corporation).  Stockholders recover only after satisfaction of these liquidated 
claims, but they keep whatever is left over, i.e., the residual upside.  These adverse 
rights lead to a class conflict in the corporation over risk and investment: stockhold-
ers may prefer a low probability, high investment return because they collect the resi-
due; contra, bondholders may prefer a high probability, low investment return be-
cause they get paid first and gain nothing from risk in excess of what is required for a 
return of their capital.  When OBS liabilities increase the residual upside, these li-
abilities let the firm leverage the bondholders’ money free of the contractual protec-
tions for which the bondholders bargained.  This is the private firm version of the 
financing moral hazard in banks.  See infra note 185.  Conversely, OBS assets may in-
ure to the benefit of the bondholder to the extent that the OBS asset may be used to 
fund the bondholder’s fixed claim on firm assets. 
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may also increase existing agency costs for shareholders.131  Manage-
ment accounting will carefully monitor these arrangements to the ex-
tent that they are material to the decisions faced by a firm’s manag-
ers.132  Some firm outsiders such as institutional creditors may also 
bargain for this type of information.133  Financial databases, an impor-
tant public source of firm-level information, however, usually lack 
much information about OBS items.134   
To illustrate the motivations that lead corporate officials to use 
OBS arrangements, the next section discusses cash flow games used 
by two companies implicated in the accounting controversies that led 
to the Act, Enron and Dynegy. 
B. Cash Flow Games 
The purpose of this particular Enron strategy was for Enron to 
receive liquidity from a bank without increasing the firm’s financial 
 
 131 Cash flow from an OBS item intensifies the agency problem over free cash flow 
because it is harder for corporate stakeholders to monitor activities sourced off-the-
balance sheet.  The new OBS disclosure rule could reduce the agency costs for the 
shareholder if the disclosure helps to monitor the agent’s opportunism by revealing 
the nature of the free cash flow more accurately.  Cf. George G. Triantis, Organizations 
as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Com-
mercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102 (2004) (modeling a firm as 
an internal capital pool in which legal restrictions on liquidity restrict managerial 
discretion, including the freedom to consume perquisites).  So, apart from the op-
portunity cost of liquidity, i.e., foregone investment return, restraining managers’ 
opportunism is a governance reason why shareholders might prefer to limit a firm’s 
liquidity.  For an empirical analysis of how free cash flow impacts managerial deci-
sion-making, see John Paul Broussard et al., CEO Incentives, Cash Flow, and Investment, 
FIN. MGMT., July 1, 2004, at 51 (analyzing different incentives for chief executive offi-
cers to encourage them to invest excess cash flow for the benefit of shareholders). 
 132 To the extent that OBS items may impact the firm, its management accounting 
will track the risk.  See GARRISON ET AL., supra note 120, at 9: 
     Financial accounting is mandatory; that is, it must be done.  Various 
outside parties such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
and the tax authorities require periodic financial statements.  Manage-
rial accounting, on the other hand, is not mandatory.  A company is 
completely free to do as much or as little as it wishes.  No regulatory 
bodies or other outside agencies specify what is to be done, or, for that 
matter, whether anything is to be done at all.  Since managerial ac-
counting is completely optional, the important question is always, “Is 
the information useful?” rather than, “Is the information required?” 
Id.  If the information is useful to the firm’s managers, ought it not be revealed to 
investors and other market intermediaries? 
 133 See Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to 
Monitor, 50 J. FIN. 1113 (1995). 
 134 See Imhoff et al., supra note 119, at 63 (finding that financial databases of Dun 
and Bradstreet, Value Line, and Compact Disclosure did not reflect the value of le-
gally binding OBS operating lease commitments in firms’ financial information). 
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ratios by having to report a liability on the Enron balance sheet.135  At 
this time, Enron needed to maintain its credit standing to avoid a 
negative funding spiral.136  If its credit rating were to drop, some en-
ergy trading counterparties would stop dealing with the firm, depriv-
ing it of operating cash flow.137  Worse still, if Enron’s credit dropped 
below investment grade, trading counterparties would demand more 
collateral (taxing liquidity further), the interest cost of some variable 
rate debt would increase, some payment obligations would become 
accelerated, and Enron would be locked out of the commercial paper 
market, hence worsening the firm’s illiquidity spiral.138   
Finessing these funding demands with its financial reporting du-
ties, Enron arranged a series of “prepays” which gave the firm more 
than $8 billion in financing over six years.139  Given their true eco-
nomic nature as loans, Enron ought to have reported the prepays as 
bank loans on its balance sheet that generated financing cash flow—
 
 135 Many of Enron’s solvency problems dealt with how the firm financed its trans-
formation from an energy company to a derivatives trading platform in which—
towards the end—ninety percent of firm revenues came from trading in increasingly 
esoteric financial derivatives like bandwidth and pollution-emission credits.  See 
Ronald Fink, Beyond Enron: The Fate of Andrew Fastow and Company Casts a Harsh Light 
on Off-Balance-Sheet Financing, CFO, Feb. 2002, available at http://www.findarticles. 
com/p/articles/mi_m3870/is_2_18/ai_83045541. 
 136 As has been noted: 
Enron was acutely aware of the importance of its credit ratings.  In its 
1999 annual report, Enron management stated that the company’s 
“continued investment grade status is critical to the success of its 
wholesale business as well as its ability to maintain adequate liquidity.”  
. . . An investment grade rating was needed not only to keep down 
credit costs but also because various trigger provisions for support of 
[off-balance sheet entities] would be activated in the event of a ratings 
downgrade. 
See MARKHAM, supra note 57, at 100. 
 137 See The Role of the Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse, Before the Permanent 
Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
107th Cong. 220 (2002) (prepared statement of Robert L. Roach, Counsel & Chief 
Investigator, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations), app. A, Accounting Treatment of 
Prepays: Effect of Enron’s Financial Statement, at A-2 to A-4 [hereinafter Accounting 
Treatment of Prepays], available at http://www.gpo.gov/congress/senate/ 
senate12sh107.html (Click “TXT” or “PDF” links under “S. Hrg. 107-618 — The Role 
of the Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse”). 
 138 Id. at A-5. 
 139 See The Role of the Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse, Before the Permanent 
Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
107th Cong. 16 (2002) (prepared statement of Robert L. Roach, Counsel & Chief In-
vestigator, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations) [hereinafter Role of the Financial 
Institutions], available at http://www.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate12sh107.html 
(Click “TXT” or “PDF” links under “S. Hrg. 107-618 — The Role of the Financial In-
stitutions in Enron’s Collapse”).  Of this amount, Chase Manhattan Bank provided 
$3.7 billion and Citigroup provided $4.8 billion.  Id. 
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rather than operational cash flow—on the statement of cash flows.140  
Had Enron reported the prepays this way, credit ratios which deter-
mined the firm’s ongoing credit access would have deteriorated.  In-
deed, the debt-to-equity ratio would have risen from about 69% to 
about 96%, and the debt-to-total-capital ratio would have increased 
from about 40% to 49%.141 
The mechanics of the transaction are a bit more complicated.142  
Again, Enron wanted to borrow money without reporting a loan on 
its balance sheet.  So Enron structured the deal as a pair of commodi-
ties trades.  The would-be lender—in this case, the bank—wanted to 
make a loan but did not want to speculate in commodities.  Ordinar-
ily Enron would reflect a loan from a bank on the firm’s balance 
sheet as a liability and report the cash inflow on the firm’s statement 
of cash flows as a financing cash flow.  But another of Enron’s prefer-
ences about this transaction was to keep the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio 
as low as possible (lenders will charge more to lend to a firm with a 
high debt-to-equity ratio).  Of course, an accounting question arises 
as to whether these arrangements are a trade or a loan, which would 
entail adverse balance sheet consequences.143   
In order to avoid classifying the transaction as a loan, Enron in-
serted a sham counterparty between Enron and the bank.144  In this 
way, Enron converted the loan from the bank into two sales contracts.  
In the deal, the bank would “buy” a fixed amount of commodities 
from the sham counterparty.  Next, Enron would “sell” that same 
amount of commodities to the sham counterparty.  So far these were 
two commodity contracts with only incidental credit risk (although 
the net effect of the deal was that Enron had sold commodities to the 
bank). 
In order to keep the bank from bearing the commodity price 
risk in the sales, Enron also entered into a swap with the bank.145  In 
the swap, the bank would exchange the market value of the com-
 
 140 Id. at 14. 
 141 Id. at 17.  See also Accounting Treatment of Prepays, supra note 137, at A-4. 
 142 See Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court Appointed Examiner at 58–
67 & app. E, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.enron.com/corp/por/examiner2.html. 
 143 A loan compensates the lender for credit risk and the commodity value of 
money.  A trade compensates the trader for price risk in the commodity.  Settlement 
does expose a trader to the counterparty’s credit risk incidentally, but it is the (up-
side) commodity price risk and not the counterparty credit risk which induces the 
risk-taking. 
 144 See Role of the Financial Institutions, supra note 139, at 14–15. 
 145 Id. 
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modities for the price agreed to in the original sale to the counter-
party.146  If the price of the commodities had decreased (by the time 
the bank went to sell the commodities) the swap made the bank 
whole at the original prices.147  If the price of the commodities had 
increased (by the time that the bank went to sell the commodities) 
the swap terms required the bank to transfer that upside to Enron, 
which would give the bank only the original fixed prices.148  Using the 
OBS swap, thus gave the bank the credit risk which it wanted without 
exposing the bank to commodity price risk.149  Why would the bank 
enter into this deal?  The bank wanted and received the loan interest 
and fees from what was really an effective loan. 
Another energy company (and Enron trading counterparty), 
Dynegy, also used creative accounting to turn financing into opera-
tional cash flow, at least as a financial reporting matter. In 2001, secu-
rities analysts compared Dynegy’s accrual-based earnings with its op-
erating cash flow and concluded that the operating cash flow did not 
seem to sustain the share price of Dynegy stock.150  The company 
needed more operating cash flow to support the trading price of its 
stock.151  To reassure (and mislead) its critics, Dynegy generated 
phantom operational cash flow using OBS arrangements that were 
later deemed loans as a matter of law.152  As with the Enron prepays, 
the disclosure of loan rather than operating cash flow (i.e., effective 
capital structure) would have depressed Dynegy’s share price, re-
duced the firm’s credit access, and triggered a negative funding spiral 
like the one described above for Enron.  As part of the SEC’s order to 
institute cease-and-desist proceedings, Dynegy agreed to restate its 
2001 financial statements to more accurately reflect the firm’s effec-
tive capital structure.153 
 
 146 Id. 
 147 See id. 
 148 See id. 
 149 See id. at 15. 
 150 See Katrina M. Miltich, A Slap on the Wrist: Dynegy, Inc. v. Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 983, 984–85 (2003) (reviewing 
the facts and major legal issues in the Dynegy matter). 
 151 See In re Dynegy Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-46537 (Sept. 25, 2002), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17744.htm.  See generally 
Miltich, supra note 150, at 983. 
 152 James Olis, the financier who designed the arrangement, now faces a twenty-
four-year sentence.  See Nichols, supra note 100. 
 153 See Miltich, supra note 150, at 986. 
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C. The Materiality of Effective Capital Structure 
Given the gap, then, between the foreseeably misleading finan-
cial reports prepared by managers and the realties of the cash flow 
games which these reports seek to address, what should financial re-
porting law do?  Mapping a firm’s effective capital structure is the 
counter-move to the earnings management practices made possible 
by the accounting discretion.  So, financial reporting law should en-
courage more comprehensive measurement of a firm’s effective capi-
tal structure. 154   This would mean reflecting more of a firm’s volatility 
in messier financial reports.  Like the shadows in Plato’s allegory 
about the cave, public financial reports can only convey a highly se-
lective approximation of a firm’s financial reality, but increased re-
ported volatility would be more accurate.155 
The existing literature on effective capital structure focuses on 
mapping effective debt, although understanding effective equity be-
longs to effective structure analysis too.156  All effective debt analysis 
involves reconstructing the whole from the part.157  For example, 
much like proving the existence of a black hole by observing its gravi-
tational pull on matter, effective debt can be backed out by compar-
ing income tax returns (which claim business interest deductions 
 
 154 A suggestion made during the SEC’s administrative rule-making about OBS 
items epitomizes what effective capital structure is: 
The Management Discussion and Analysis should provide a pro forma 
capital structure showing the full effects of all off balance sheet financ-
ing entities.  The common stock equity of the company should be re-
cast to show the pro forma level of common equity that exists once the debt 
related aspects of the special purpose entity are factored in. . . . 
     . . . The Management Discussion and Analysis should also show the 
potential effects that imputed debt service from the special purpose en-
tity may have on the covenants in the various financing agreements for 
the company. . . . [T]he full effects should be shown. 
See Letter from Kevin M. Bronner, Ph.D, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 13, 2002), available at http://sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/s74202/kmbronner1.htm (emphases added). 
 155 Apart from any limitations in the reports themselves, public disclosures are 
only as complete as their underlying markets: “Given that many of the assets and 
claims reported on the financial statements are represented by imperfect or incom-
plete markets, . . . . the ‘ideal’ that financial statements are attempting to represent is 
not clear conceptually.”  BEAVER, supra note 5, at 4.  For an explanation of Plato’s al-
legory about bounded rationality, see S. Marc Cohen, The Allegory of the Cave, 
http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/cave.htm (last updated July 8, 2002). 
 156 The federal government’s position as a stand-by source of equity capital to bail 
out insured depositors of failed banks is an example of effective equity. 
 157 The forensic accounting exercises which Congressional subcommittees en-
gaged in when reconstructing Enron’s effective balance sheet are an example of ef-
fective debt analysis.  See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
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from both “book” and effective liabilities) and the balance sheet 
(which includes only “book” debt).158  Undisclosed debt exists to the 
extent that the tax interest deductions suggest debt greater than the 
book debt.159  Debt rating agencies approximate effective capital 
structure when considering the impact of OBS items on a credit rat-
ing.160  Capitalizing OBS leases into the equity account rather than as 
a liability may better reflect the all-in cost of OBS items.161  Investors, 
though, lack the time and resources needed to infer true capital 
structure. 
Comprehensively measuring cash flow is a key aspect of effective 
capital structure.  A firm manages its day-to-day liquidity on the basis 
of financial cash flow.162  Though valuable, financial cash flow is hard 
to square with the balance sheet and the income statement, which 
use different accounting methods to present financial information.163  
 
 158 One team of researchers inferred the level of OBS debt by comparing public 
firms’ SEC filings with their federal income taxes.  Lillian F. Mills & Kaye J. New-
berry, Firms’ Off-Balance Sheet Financing: Evidence from their Book-Tax Reporting 
Differences (January 5, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=49474 (later 
published as Lillian F. Mills & Kaye J. Newberry, Firms’ Off-Balance Sheet and Hybrid 
Debt Financing: Evidence from their Book-Tax Reporting Differences, 43 J. ACCT. RES. 251 
(2005)). 
 159 Id. 
 160 These OBS factors include: operating leases, pension obligations, debt of joint 
ventures and unconsolidated subsidiaries, guarantees, receivables that have been fac-
tored or sold with recourse, potential legal judgments or settlements of lawsuits, and 
other contingent liabilities, including environmental cleanup liabilities.  STANDARD 
AND POOR’S, CREDIT POLICY UPDATE: FACTORING OFF-BALANCE SHEET FINANCING INTO 
THE RATINGS PROCESS 1–2 (April 15, 2002) (on file with author) (reviewing Standard 
and Poor’s rating criteria for off-balance sheet items) (available to registered Stan-
dard and Poor’s users at http://www.standardandpoors.com).  As per the Efficient 
Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH), it is specialized intermediaries that first analyze 
raw financial data and then internalize it by buying or selling securities in the open 
market or preparing market intelligence for use by other investors.  The market in-
ternalizes the information as trading prices begin to internalize the information.  
Debt rating agencies serve this function for OBS items by treating operating lease 
expenses as a permanent part of a firm’s effective capital structure. 
 161 See Steve C. Lim, Steven C. Mann & Vassil T. Mihov, Market Evaluation of Off 
Balance Sheet Financing: You Can Run but You Can’t Hide 2 (Dec. 1, 2003), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=474784 (comparing the im-
pact of OBS operating lease financing on a firm’s debt cost for 6800 U.S. issuers).  
The study examined whether credit ratings reflected this aspect of the firms’ effective 
capital structure.  Id.  The authors compared two valuation approaches to the OBS 
items: treating the OBS item as a current liability or as permanent part of the com-
pany’s capital.  Id.  They concluded that the perpetuity approach resulted in a higher 
actual cost, which better reflected the true cost of the leases.  Id. 
 162 Cash is fungible.  From a cash management perspective, then, it makes no dif-
ference whether a cash inflow or outflow arises on or off the balance sheet. 
 163 The main reporting formats are: the balance sheet, the income statement, the 
statement of changes in equity, and the statement of cash flows.  See generally 
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Examples like the cash flow games played by Enron illustrate the gap 
between tracking financial cash flow and reported cash flow.  Instead 
of financial cash flow, the statement of cash flows reflects accounting 
cash flow, the best publicly available proxy for a firm’s financial cash 
flow.164  Tracking accounting cash flow has many virtues, as shown by 
the SEC’s wide use of this technique to explain the OBS sector to 
Congress,165 the use of cash flow to measure firm profitability,166 the 
 
DYCKMAN ET AL., supra note 108, at 118–219.  For a good summary of these financial 
reports (including the statement of cash flows), see SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 
11–14.  These reports may use historical price information or current market values 
to price assets, may calculate asset and liability values using either cash methods or 
accrual methods, typically make no adjustment for the time value of money when 
considering cash flows in different periods, and, finally, may use different probability 
thresholds to determine whether an item needs to be disclosed at all.  At best, these 
varied measures can provide only an impressionistic rendering of the dynamically 
shifting financial values that make up a firm.  In this sense, cash flow intrudes into 
the neat formalisms of forward projection and financial reporting. 
 164 Accounting cash flow refers to a public representation of a firm’s financial cash 
flow that conforms to generally accepted accounting principles.  Ongoing debates 
about the advantages of a cash-flow tax rather than an income tax refer to account-
ing cash flow.  See Chris Edwards, Replace the Scandal-Plagued Corporate Income Tax with 
a Cash-Flow Tax, in AFTER ENRON: LESSONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 283 (William Niskanen 
ed., 2005) (Edwards argues that cash-flow tax would eliminate many of the current 
distortions of corporate income caused by the income tax). 
 165 In its statutorily required (15 U.S.C. § 7261) report, the SEC stressed the re-
porting value of cash flow: “What presents difficulties for investors, as well as the 
market as a whole, is a lack of information about potential positive and negative cash 
flows.”  See SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 5.  The Report also used cash flow scenario 
analysis throughout.  See id. at 59 (using cash flow scenario analysis to estimate the 
value firm’s obligations under employee defined-benefit plans); id. at 65 (estimating 
the value of cash flows from capital leases); id. at 67 (using cash flow scenario analysis 
to estimate the value of contingent obligations); id. at 89 (using cash flow to measure 
the impact of purchase and sale obligations of filers). 
 166 See BEAVER, supra note 5, at 5 (noting the trend in security valuation away from 
earnings measurement and towards discounted cash flow valuation).  A 1994 survey 
of chief financial officers reported a moderate increase (54% to 62%) of officers who 
made maximizing cash flow a top priority from a previous survey.  CFO Forum: King 
Cash, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (AM. ED.), Sept. 1994, at 93.  Increasingly, CFOs use 
cash flow based measures to determine employee compensation.  See STEPHEN GATES, 
CFO 2000: THE GLOBAL CFO AS STRATEGIC BUSINESS PARTNER 13 (Conference Bd. 
1998) (conducted interviews and surveys of chief financial officers regarding compo-
sition of the CFO function).  Chief financial officers have called for increased use of 
cash flow in earnings rather than net income.  See Barney Jopson, CFO Urges Cashflow 
as New Measure, FINANCIAL TIMES (London, England), Apr. 21, 2005, at 22.  Some 
theorists agree.  See Pablo Fernández, Cash Flow Is a Fact. Net Income Is Just an 
Opinion 1 (Mar. 18, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=330540 (“A com-
pany’s net income is a quite arbitrary figure obtained after assuming certain account-
ing hypotheses regarding expenses and revenues.  On the other hand, the cash flow 
is an objective measure, a single figure that is not subject to any personal criterion.”).  
Some qualify the value of cash flow information over accrual earnings by pointing 
out that cash flow data is more relevant for firms experiencing rapid growth or de-
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use of cash flow analysis by credit agencies,167 and the pedagogical 
value of cash analogies.168  Of course, uncertainty limits the ability to 
project future cash flow.169  The statement of cash flows nets cash in-
flows and cash outflows for a time period between two balance 
sheets.170  The statement does not reflect accrual losses or gains.171  
 
cline, but that accrual earnings say more about a firm during a steady period of the 
firm’s life.  See Divesh Shankar Sharma & Errol Iselin, The Decision Usefulness of Re-
ported Cash Flow and Accrual Information in a Behavioral Field Experiment, 33 ACCT. & 
BUS. RES. (U.K.) 123 (2003) (noting that information about a firm’s cash flows may 
be useful only for a firm facing solvency problems). 
 167 Reflecting the value of cash flow analysis, credit rating agencies note the im-
portance of cash flow in their rating decisions.  See Hearings on the Current Role and 
Functions of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets Before the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission 113 (Nov. 15, 2002) (testimony of Leo C. O’Neill, Presi-
dent, Standard & Poor’s), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/ 
credrate111502.txt (“The information that we get, in most cases, is corporations,  
projections, call it what you will, their view of their future cash requirements, how 
their capital spending is going to go, what their cash flow is going to be to support 
that . . . .”). 
 168 Analogizing to cash also helps to explain some income tax concepts.  Students 
seem to find it easier to understand cash consideration than other forms of property.  
When explaining the tax implications of a transaction with noncash consideration, I 
encourage students to restate the consideration on both sides as cash and to analyze 
the issue restated that way.  The tax effects of the notional cash exchange will gener-
ally mirror the tax effects of the actual noncash transactions.  For example, to sim-
plify the analysis in the case, restate as cash the consideration in Philadelphia Park 
Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954), which addresses in-
come recognition and basis for taxable exchanges. 
 169 As Beaver notes: 
A common approach to valuation of complex claims under uncertainty 
is to take a valuation model derived from certainty, such as the dis-
counted cash flow model, and to replace each variable in that formula 
with the expected value of that variable to reflect the uncertainty . . . . 
In a multiperiod setting, characterizing the present value or price of a 
complex claim in terms of discounting expected cash flow [under un-
certainty] at expected rates of return is not possible in general. 
See BEAVER, supra note 5, at 60–61; id. at 49 (noting the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board’s preference for accrual earnings over cash flow). 
 170 Cash flow discounting may actually refer to any of ten different methodologies 
for valuation.  See Pablo Fernández, Equivalence of Ten Different Methods for Valuing 
Companies by Cash Flow Discounting, 1 INT’L J. FIN. EDUC. 141, 142–43 (2005), available 
at http://www.senatehall.com/getfile.php?file=paper140.pdf (identifying ten alter-
native cash flow discounting methods). 
 171 Accrual accounting records resource inflows and outflows based not on actual 
cash flows, but instead on the basis of whether a firm’s legally-enforceable rights (or 
obligations with respect to outflows) have vested.  See DYCKMAN ET AL., supra note 108, 
at 33–34.  A firm’s statement of income identifies what the firm’s net profit or loss 
position was during a specific period, typically one year’s economic activity.  The in-
come statement provides a bridge between a firm’s balance sheet at the beginning of 
the period in question and the balance sheet at the end of the reporting period.  A 
typical income statement reflects various different measures of income, typically ac-
crual income plus other adjustments.  Some measures try to reconcile accrual earn-
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Rather, it reflects only accounting cash outflows and inflows.172  The 
statement lets a reader compare accrual-based earnings or balance 
sheet values with accounting cash flow, sourced on- or off-balance-
sheet.  Any single financial indicator has its limits and this is also true 
for measures that track cash flow.173  Publicly revealing more about fi-
nancial cash flow would lead to the appearance of volatility for 
firms.174  Part IV recommends changes to make the statement of cash 
 
ings with cash flow by adding back to accrual earnings accounting adjustments that 
do not reflect actual funds outlays.  For example, accounting goodwill is a wasting 
asset for which a firm “accounts” by allocating a portion of the deemed waste in 
goodwill in each accounting period, i.e., amortization of goodwill.  So, since accrual 
earnings reflect the amortization of goodwill, all else being equal, they will be lower 
than actual cash earnings for the same period.  One approach to reconcile book 
earnings to cash flow is to add back the amount of amortized goodwill to the accrual 
amount. 
 172 An accrual loss would occur when the ultimate value of an asset or receivable 
turns out to be less than its book value.  See generally DYCKMAN ET AL., supra note 108, 
at 40–41.  Assume that a firm books an account receivable on the asset side of its bal-
ance sheet for $100.  If the firm collects only $80 on the account, the deficit gives rise 
to an accrued loss reflected only on the income statement.  The statement of cash 
flows would reflect an operating inflow of $80.  Conversely, if a firm collects $120 in 
exchange for investment securities booked on the asset side of the balance sheet for 
$100, the firm books a gain in the income statement of $20.  The amount reflected as 
an investment cash flow is $120. 
 173 Accrual accounting makes possible the economic matching of the expenses 
and revenues from a project.  See BEAVER, supra note 5, at 2 (“Reporting cash receipts 
and cash disbursements will not properly match, and some form of accrual account-
ing is called for.”).  See also Cunningham, supra note 1, at 928 (noting limitations of 
cash flow reporting). 
 174 Agreeing with this view, an accounting study group considering the future bal-
ance sheet urged more cash flow-based analysis and disclosure, despite the resulting 
appearance of volatility: 
     The balance sheet of the future will be a more flexible instrument, 
able to adapt to a wide variety of industries and circumstances. . . .  
     . . . [It] would permit the display of different kinds of numbers—
either in a range, or presented as alternatives.  This approach could be 
used to portray cash transactions for which audit assurance is highest, 
the historical cost allocations of prior cash transactions, [and] market 
values from actual arms’-length transactions . . . . 
     . . . [W]e recognize that financial reports prepared in this fashion 
would appear to be considerably more volatile, complex and subjective 
than the financial reports we are accustomed to scrutinizing today. . . . 
     . . . [I]t is the illusion of exactitude that carries with it the false per-
ception that financial reports are relatively stable and easily compara-
ble. . . . [We] believe the current emphasis on reducing volatility, com-
plexity, and subjectivity and on seeking a greater degree of 
comparability needs tempering.  The world, the economy, and the 
business environment are in a constant state of flux and any financial 
reporting system that tries to distill all the data contained in increas-
ingly complex financial statements into one verifiable, static number 
such as GAAP EPS [earnings per share] flies in the face of reality. 
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flows more useful as a public financial report by reflecting volatility, 
which is currently airbrushed out of the statement. 
The statement of cash flows was the last major financial report to 
become widely used by firms.175  Ever reactive on accounting matters, 
the SEC began to mandate the disclosure of cash flow information by 
firms for the first time after an agency study recommended the man-
datory disclosure of accounting cash flow.176  During this same period 
 
AM. ASSEMBLY, COLUMBIA UNIV., THE FUTURE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 11, 
available at http://www.americanassembly.org/programs.dir/report_file.dir/ 
accounting_report_report_file_future%20of%20the%20accounting%20profession 
%20report%20final.pdf. 
 175 At the time of the New Deal, firms did not use the statement of cash flows 
widely, although accounting teachers had thought of a statement of the sources and 
uses of funds, and some firms were already voluntarily disclosing liquidity informa-
tion.  See Karl Käfer & V.K. Zimmerman, Notes on the Evolution of the Statement of Sources 
and Applications of Funds, 1 INT’L. J. ACCT. EDUC. & RES. 89–121 (1965) (tracing state-
ment from emergence in the early 1900s through the early 1960s in UK and USA; 
the book contains an anthology of essays tracing the development of public financial 
reporting).  Large railroad concerns were the first to include these statements in 
their financial statements.  Id.  A turn-of-the-century financial columnist, Thomas 
Warner Mitchell, was probably the first to publish systematic analyses of the sources 
and uses of funds by companies in the United States.  See CORPORATE FINANCIAL 
REPORTING AND ANALYSIS IN THE EARLY 1900S 191-215 (Richard P. Brelf ed., 1986) 
(analyzing liquidity changes by the International Paper Company, the Tennessee 
Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company, and the Chicago and Alton Railroad Company).  
See also Cunningham, supra note 1, at 216–20 (discussing the development of the 
cash flow statement in the United Kingdom and Germany).  Voluntary disclosures of 
cash flow information seems to be a pattern elsewhere too.  See Christian Leuz, The 
Development of Voluntary Cash Flow Statements in Germany and the Influence of International 
Reporting Standards, 52 SCHMALENBACH BUS. REV. 182 (2000) (showing how German 
firms voluntarily reported cash flow information before any legal requirement to do 
so).  U.S. Accounting authorities started requiring a statement of cash flows in 1971.  
For a comprehensive survey of cash flow products—especially in the United King-
dom—see T.A. LEE, TOWARDS A THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CASH FLOW ACCOUNTING 
(1986) (reviews history of cash flow accounting, accounting for goodwill and enter-
prise income, and the use of cash flow accounting to track firm profitability). 
 176 In 1971, the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants issued Opinion 19, recommending the inclusion of a “State-
ment of Changes in Financial Position” in a firm’s financial statements.  AM. INST. OF 
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD OPINION NO. 19: 
REPORTING CHANGES IN FINANCIAL POSITION (1972).  The main objective of Opinion 
No. 19 was to “summarize the financing and investing activities of the entity, includ-
ing the extent to which the enterprise has generated funds from operations during 
the period.”  Id. at ¶ 4 (quoted in J.W. Giese & T.P. Klammer, Achieving the Objectives 
of APB Opinion No. 19, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Mar. 1974, at 54–55).  Research conducted 
after the adoption of Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 19 found substantial 
noncompliance with the requirements.  See Giese & Klammer, supra, at 54, 57 (con-
cluding from a financial reporting study of fifty Fortune 500 firms that one-half of 
the firms did not properly label the sources and uses of funds).  German firms also 
failed to comply with cash flow reporting requirements after it became a duty to 
make the disclosures.  See Günther Gebhardt & Aaron Heilmann, Compliance with 
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cash flow became a popular way of valuing the firm.177  In 1985, the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) began to adopt cash 
flow valuation for selected situations, starting with the treatment of 
pensions.178  Only in 1987 did FASB require the disclosure of account-
ing cash flow in a firm’s financial reports.  Beginning in that year, 
firms had to report cash flow classified according to whether it was re-
lated to operating,179 investing,180 or financing181 activity, a classifica-
tion to which I return in my recommendations. 
 
German and International Accounting Standards in Germany: Evidence From Cash Flow 
Statements, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF ACCOUNTING 218 (Leuz et al. eds., 
2004) (documenting that a majority of firms failed to report operating, investing, 
and financing cash flows as required by IAS7, the cash flow standard of the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board, and GAS2, the German accounting standard on 
cash flow).  One reason for the belated recognition of cash is the accounting profes-
sion’s historic preference for measures based on accrual earnings over cash flow in-
dicators as a measure of firm value.  See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT 
OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 1: OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING BY 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES ¶ 44 (1978), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con1.pdf. 
“Information about enterprise earnings and its components measured by accrual ac-
counting generally provides a better indication of enterprise performance than does 
information about current cash receipts and payments.” Id.  This subordination of 
cash flow to accrual measures has hindered the comprehensive financial reporting of 
a firm’s balance sheet and OBS sectors. 
 177 For an example of how law has incorporated cash flow analysis, consider how 
judges in Delaware dissenter’s appraisal proceedings rely on cash flow discounting.  
See generally Joseph Evan Calio, New Appraisals of Old Problems: Reflections on the Delaware 
Appraisal Proceeding, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (1994) (documenting the increase in use of 
cash flow discounting by judges since a 1983 case authorized the use of any generally 
accepted financial valuation technique). 
 178 See Siegel, supra note 29, at 1851 (noting the adoption of cash flow valuation by 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board for pensions in 1985 and employee bene-
fit plans in 1990).  The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has been wryly 
commissioned the “SEC’s SPE (Special Purpose Entity)” because of its funding value.  
See George Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 813, 834 
(2003). “The SEC liked, and likes, having an off-budget source of financing for activi-
ties that it otherwise would be required to fund.  FASB is the SEC’s SPE (Special 
Purpose Entity).”  Id. 
 179 Operating cash flow reflects net cash flow from a firm’s core business, sales in 
the context of a merchandising concern, interest rate differentials and fee income in 
the context of a depository institution, capital return in the context of a registered 
broker-dealer, and the net return on underwriting in the context of an insurance 
company.  See generally EUGENE BRIGHAM & MICHAEL EHRHARDT, FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE 40–41 (10th ed. 2002).  Operating cash flow tells 
a reader of a firm’s financial statements how much liquidity arose or was consumed 
by the firm’s core business.  Id.  In this sense, operating cash flow may be the best in-
dicator of trends in a firm’s going concern value.  Operating cash flow may be calcu-
lated with either the direct or indirect method, which presents operating activities in 
different ways but leads to the same net cash flow from operations.  See DYCKMAN ET 
AL., supra note 108, at 1189.  The indirect method derives the same net operating 
cash flow amount by adjusting net income for items whose operating cash flow and 
income effects are unequal.  If the company chooses to report operations cash flow 
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Of firms, only banks come close to disclosing their effective capi-
tal structure because they must report their OBS positions to their 
banking supervisors.182  In these reports, the bank calculates its effec-
tive capital structure by converting OBS items into their balance sheet 
equivalents.  Many of these items are credit exposures to borrowers, 
so conversion means that the bank adds these notional asset values to 
its balance sheet, which must still balance even as adjusted.183  Be-
cause prudential regulation imposes composition requirements on 
bank capital, e.g., Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital requirements, bank regu-
lators say that the bank faces a “capital charge” on the formally OBS 
item.184  Banking supervisors demand that banks reveal their effective 
 
under the direct method, the firm must also include a supplemental schedule show-
ing the reconciliation of earnings and net operating cash flows, i.e., a schedule of the 
indirect method.  Id. 
 180 Investment cash flow reflects both the cash flow from a firm’s position-taking 
in investment markets—just like any other investor in the capital market—as well as 
the net cash effects of investing in (or liquidating) assets that support the firm’s core 
business.  DYCKMAN, supra note 108, at 1191–92.  So, for example, investment cash 
flow reflects the net return on a firm’s securities portfolio.  Investment cash flow also 
reflects allocations of cash to buy physical plant, depreciable equipment, franchises, 
and other capital assets whose income is included in operating cash flow. 
 181 Financing cash flow reflects the firm’s cash position as a borrower and lender 
in the capital market.  Id. at 1192. 
 182 Since 1913, all state member banks of the Federal Reserve System must file 
“call” reports of financial condition with their respective regulator.  See Federal Re-
serve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.); 12 U.S.C. § 632 (2000).  The Federal Financial Institutions Ex-
amination Council coordinates the collection and dissemination of the call report, 
which says much about banks’ OBS items.  See Fed. Fin. Inst. Examination Council, 
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for a Bank With Domestic and For-
eign Offices, Schedule RC-L Derivatives and Off Balance Sheet Items (June 30, 
2005), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/PDF/FFIEC_forms/FFIEC031_20050630_f. 
pdf.  Schedule RC-L distinguishes between OBS assets and OBS liabilities.  Consider 
the Comptroller of the Currency’s tough love advice to its banks on this point: 
     A gap report that does not include off-balance-sheet interest rate 
positions does not fully measure a bank’s interest rate risk profile.  All 
material positions in off-balance-sheet instruments whose value can be 
affected by interest rates should be captured in a gap report.  Such in-
struments include interest rate contracts, such as swaps, futures, and 
forwards; option contracts, such as caps, floors, and options on futures; 
and firm forward commitments to buy or sell loans, securities, or other 
financial instruments. 
U.S. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INTEREST RATE RISK: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 
78 (1997), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/irr.pdf. 
 183 The fundamental accounting equation still holds for this notional balance 
sheet. 
 184 Extra prudent through asymmetry, prudential regulation does not generally 
give regulatory capital credit, i.e., count an item as equity capital, for OBS commit-
ments from a third party to contribute risk capital to a depository institution.  In-
stead, banking regulators tend to give capital credit only for “a dollar on the barrel.”  
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capital structure in regulatory reports because of the spillover risks 
from bank failure and because federally-insured banking exposes the 
federal government to liquidity risk.185  Private firms do not directly 
expose the federal government to such risk and, hence, are not sub-
ject to the same degree of transparency.186 
III. SLOUCHING TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY IN SARBANES-OXLEY 
Faced with the transactional complexities discussed in Part II, 
above, Congress turned away from a more detailed look at financial 
reporting requirements and, instead, penalized individuals.  Sar-
banes-Oxley did, however, add some transparency about effective 
capital structure, namely a direction to the SEC to require firms to 
better disclose OBS arrangements.  After noting the SEC’s reluctance 
to engage seriously with accounting, this Part analyzes the new OBS 
rule, which is a step in the right direction.  It contributes to financial 
literacy by legally classifying some types of OBS arrangements.187  
Nevertheless, the SEC—and I—conclude that more is needed. 
A. Retreating to Accounting in Law 
No statute explicitly charges the SEC with developing account-
ing standards.  The New Deal’s Securities Act and the Exchange Act 
gave the SEC authority over accounting standards.188  These authori-
 
Interview with Dr. Roger Tufts, Capital Department, Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, in Washington, D.C. (June 16, 2005) (on file with author). 
 185 Regulation protects bank solvency because of the federal government’s con-
tingent exposure from insurance for customer deposits.  Financially speaking, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) bears residual loss when banks be-
come insolvent.  In this sense, the FDIC is short a put on the national portfolio of the 
depositor institution, creating an appealing moral hazard for bank owners, who bear 
only the residual upside in this lopsided deal.  (A “put” is a legal obligation to buy an 
asset for a fixed price.  By ensuring depositor obligations, it is as though the FDIC 
has promised to “buy” the assets of a failed bank in exchange for assuming its deposi-
tor obligations.)  Given its short exposure, the federal government makes banks hike 
up their skirts with respect to OBS items.  For that reason, bank regulators require 
banks to maintain enough capital to meet even OBS exposures. 
 186 The limited liability of corporations and other forms of business organization, 
however, certainly produces social costs that are sometimes borne by the federal gov-
ernment. 
 187 As discussed in Part IV, standardizing information about the firm’s constituent 
cash flows would help both investors and firms. 
 188 The Securities Act and the Exchange Act give the SEC parallel authority over 
accounting.  Securities Act of 1933 § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2000 & Supp. II 2002); Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000 & Supp. II 2002).  The 
SEC’s new OBS rule requiring disclosure of OBS arrangements which affect a regis-
trant’s liquidity and capital resources is based in part on these essentially parallel 
grants of authority.  Although Congress passed these laws during a national panic, 
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ties specifically extend to the form and use of the balance sheet.189  
Instead of using this authority directly, the SEC has let private stan-
dard setters make accounting pronouncements, often at the cost of 
sound accounting principles.190  This hands-off policy delayed ade-
 
that situation was not a moral panic—financial or otherwise—because the scope of 
the New Deal’s state-building was proportional to a generalized and serious eco-
nomic crisis.  For a good general discussion of the early history of the SEC’s use of 
accounting, see THE SEC AND ACCOUNTING: THE FIRST 50 YEARS (Robert H. Manheim 
& Mayes E. Leech eds., 1984) (Not surprisingly, given my thesis, the twelve essays 
make virtually no mention of the off-balance sheet sector or cash flow disclosures and 
their utility as regulatory indicators.). 
 189 The Securities Act provides: 
Among other things, the Commission shall have authority, for the pur-
poses of this title . . ., to prescribe the form or forms in which required 
information shall be set forth, the items or details to be shown in the 
balance sheet and earning statement, and the methods to be followed 
in the preparation of accounts, in the appraisal or valuation of assets 
and liabilities, in the determination of depreciation and depletion, in 
the differentiation of recurring and nonrecurring income, in the dif-
ferentiation of investment and operating income, and in the prepara-
tion, where the Commission deems it necessary or desirable, of consoli-
dated balance sheets or income accounts of any person directly or indirectly 
controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or 
indirect common control with the issuer. 
15 U.S.C. § 77s (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (emphasis added).  The SEC’s authority un-
der the Exchange Act is essentially identical except that the provision also grants au-
thority to deconsolidate the balance sheet of a registrant: “The Commission may pre-
scribe . . . the methods to be followed . . . in the preparation . . . of separate and/or 
consolidated balance sheets or income accounts of any person directly or indirectly 
controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect com-
mon control with the issuer . . . .”  Id. § 78m(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 190 See Mundstock, supra note 178, at 817 (“Accounting, like commercial law, de-
veloped before courts and legislatures became involved in business affairs.  While 
commercial law became an object for the state, accounting principles thus far have 
not.” (footnotes omitted)).  The endowment effect is one of the reasons for the 
trend cited by Professor Mundstock: 
     Another factor that has contributed to the SEC’s ongoing abdica-
tion of responsibility over accounting principles is worth noting: Peo-
ple have a natural tendency to belittle expertise that they do not pos-
sess.  The SEC has been composed primarily of lawyers.  Lawyers do not 
want to be bothered by accounting, which they view as merely “techni-
cal.”  Hence, the SEC has been willing to leave accounting to the ac-
countants. 
Id. at 827.  Professor Mundstock notes the importance of institutional self-interest in 
standard setting: 
     To summarize the history of private standard-setting in America: the 
players [including accountants] acted in their own self-interest . . . . In-
dependence really has meant isolation and irrelevance.  The central 
feature of the resulting accounting standards is the flexibility notion: 
accounts need not be right, merely acceptable. . . . When faced with 
controversy, particularly critiques from business interests, the private 
standard setter has either reorganized or capitulated.  The SEC’s insti-
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quate regulation of OBS arrangements, which vexed fundamental ac-
counting assumptions.191  In fact, the FASB did not address how firms 
ought to treat securitized assets—one type of OBS item—until 1996.192  
Although the early and continued focus of legislative attention after 
Enron was on financier misconduct, former SEC Commissioner 
Richard Breeden introduced the idea of requiring disclosure of 
firms’ OBS arrangements into the public record on the very first day 
of the Hearings.193  Some firms had voluntarily reported some of their 
OBS arrangements after Enron’s problems had come to light, but by 
then it was clear that more was needed in terms of regulation.194  
 
tutional interests—combined with the distaste for accounting shared by 
most lawyers—have prevented the SEC from playing a proper role in 
the setting of accounting principles. 
Id. at 839. 
 191 See Donegan & Sunder, supra note 1, at 210: 
     Under our current system of financial reporting, articulation be-
tween stocks on the balance sheet and flows on the statements of in-
come and changes in cash flow is both incomplete and imperfect; the 
unavoidable lapses in articulation [i.e., mistakes and lack of correspon-
dence between items on the balance sheet and flow statements] are 
critical to understanding the OBSF [off-balance-sheet financing] prob-
lem. . . .  
     . . . How to construct correspondent variables, and under what con-
ditions it is appropriate to abandon the task of articulation, are ques-
tions that lie at the heart of the major problems in standardizing ac-
counting practice including OBSF. 
Id. at 208.  For example, market movements may change an OBS asset to a liability, 
and then back again.  Consider a swap.  When in-the-money, it is an asset to the 
swapholder.  When out-of-the-money, it becomes a liability to the same counterparty. 
See, e.g., U.S. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, AN EXAMINER’S GUIDE TO INVESTMENT 
PRODUCTS AND PRACTICES 90 (1992) (advising bank examiner to determine whether a 
bank’s swap position increases or reduces risk). 
 192 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS NO. 125: ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFER AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS 
AND EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIABILITIES (1996).  Implementation problems, though, led 
to a substitute pronouncement.  See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 140: ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFER AND SERVICING 
OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIABILITIES (2000) (creates a safe harbor 
for qualifying special purpose entities which need not be consolidated on a reporting 
firm’s balance sheet).  The direction of accounting pronouncements is towards keep-
ing the balance sheet and selectively recognizing and disclosing certain OBS items.  
See also FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS NO. 133: ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE INVESTMENTS AND HEDGING 
ACTIVITIES (1998), available at www.fasb.org/pdf/fas133.pdf. 
 193 See HEARINGS, supra note 55, at 62 (prepared statement of Richard C. Breeden, 
Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1989–1993). 
 194 See Fink, supra note 135 (describing how El Paso Corp. consolidated an OBS 
subsidiary, how Electronic Data Systems began to voluntarily report its OBS debt in 
its quarterly financial statements, and how PeopleSoft was considering book consoli-
dation of a research and development subsidiary). 
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Adopting Breeden’s suggestion, Congress directed the SEC to ad-
dress the OBS sector by studying it and amending its rules to increase 
the public disclosure of OBS arrangements.195  After rulemaking, the 
SEC amended its forms and rules to require managers to discuss OBS 
information in the management’s discussion and analysis of the an-
nual report.196  Under the new requirement, registrants must also file 
a Form 8-K whenever they assume a direct financial obligation related 
to an OBS item.197 
The OBS rule does not require recognition of OBS items on the 
balance sheet, the income statement, or the statement of cash flows 
in the sense of financially complete measurement and disclosure of 
the item.  Instead, the rule merely requires the firm to discuss the fact 
of OBS items in sufficient detail.198  As reflected in the Conference 
Report,199 which introduced H.R. 3763 (later enacted into law as the 
Act), Congress specifically expected the SEC to expand the disclosure 
requirements for registrants’ OBS arrangements, but it is not clear 
whether the current rule has done so.  For example, the OBS rule re-
quires firms to disclose OBS items only if they are “reasonably likely” 
to impact the firm, a disclosure standard which gives reporting firms 
 
 195 See supra note 15 for the language of the new statutory reporting requirement. 
 196 See SEC Final Rule, supra note 16.  These are changes to Regulations S-B and S-
K, which contain many of the SEC’s financial disclosure requirements for registrants.  
See 17 C.F.R. § 228.303(c) (2005) (part of Regulation S-B); id. § 229.303(a)(4) (2005) 
(part of Regulation S-K).  A similar requirement was imposed on the Exchange Act 
financial disclosures for foreign private issuers.  Id. § 249.220(f) (2005) (foreign pri-
vate issuers use Form 20-F to file an annual report with the SEC); id. § 249.240(f) 
(2005) (qualified Canadian issuers use Form 40-F). 
Publicly-registered companies must file public reports.  Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 §§ 13, 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (2000 & Supp. II 2002); see also 17 
C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(4)(i) (2005). 
 198 For example, the information required by Item 301 to be included on the bal-
ance sheet, the statement of income, and the statement of cash flows are subject to 
this standard of disclosure.  17 C.F.R. § 229.301 (2005).  This information is “recog-
nized” in the accounting sense that the impact of the information is reflected in the 
firm’s reported financial position.  In contrast, disclosure of the mere existence of an 
item without further elaboration of its significance provides less information to read-
ers of financial reports and leaves it to the discretion of corporate officials to decide 
the materiality. 
 199 The Act: 
requires the Commission to revise its regulations under the securities 
laws to expand the disclosure requirements for the financial reports and 
registration statements of public companies, so that they provide ade-
quate and appropriate disclosure of certain of an issuer’s off-balance 
sheet transactions. 
H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 40 (2002) (emphasis added). 
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broad leeway.200  Originally, the SEC had proposed a disclosure 
threshold lower (i.e., one that would lead to more disclosure) than 
the standard generally used for material events, but the final rule 
abandoned this approach, substituting a “reasonably likely” for a 
“more than remote” standard.201  The “reasonably likely” threshold of 
probability for disclosure defeats some of the purpose of the rule by 
letting firms off the hook in terms of disclosing their effective capital 
structure.202  As well noted, the SEC’s adoption of a relatively weak 
disclosure standard reflects successful rent-seeking by issuers, finance 
firms, and accounting firms whose separate liquidity, business, and 
liability-reduction interests converged in this rulemaking project.203 
 
 200 See SEC Final Rule, supra note 16, codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(4)(i) 
(2005). 
 201 In a January 2002 statement, the SEC indicated that “reasonably likely” is a 
lower disclosure threshold than “more likely than not.”  See Commission Statement 
About Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of 
Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8056, 67 FED. REG. 17 (Jan. 22, 2002), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-8056.htm. 
 202 See Partnoy, supra note 18, at 1278 (arguing that even under the subsequent 
OBS reporting requirements Enron managers need not have disclosed much of their 
OBS activity if they concluded that the financial downside of this activity was more 
remote than “reasonably likely”): 
     Disclosure of “reasonably likely” contingencies would not likely have 
prevented the problems associated with Enron.  Indeed, Enron argua-
bly was in compliance with the newly-enacted SEC regulations.  In as-
sessing the firm’s financial contingencies at the end of 2000, manage-
ment would not have considered a scenario in which Enron’s stock 
price would decline by more than half to be “reasonably likely.”  Ac-
cordingly, management would not have needed to disclose details 
about Enron’s derivatives contracts with the SPEs.  Nor would it have 
been “reasonably likely” that the volatility of commodity prices in 2000 
would continue. 
 203 Id.  To the extent that a company’s true financial leverage exceeds its book lev-
erage, a company’s funding costs would increase.  So issuers interested in retaining 
freedom to manage the balance sheet tactically defend managerial discretion over 
OBS disclosures.  Investment banks that collect transaction costs, i.e., fees, to plan 
and implement complex OBS deals would defend their business line.  The OBS rule 
bears on the liability of accountants by setting out the scope of required disclosures, 
so accountants have a mixed interest in the rule.  A standard which unambiguously 
establishes disclosure requirements immunizes accounting firms from pressure by 
issuers interested in particular reporting treatments that may be inconsistent with the 
standard.  On the other hand, accountants have different levels of risk-aversion too, 
and those with an appetite for more risk might prefer a rule with leeway to go out on 
a limb in terms of whether and how OBS items are booked or disclosed.  Most of the 
comments from accounting firms noted the need for clarity.  One of the advantages 
for legal and financial scholarship of federal rulemaking under the Administrative 
Procedure Act is that the comment process leaves a written record of rentseeking by 
affected constituencies.  These comments make it possible to document—and some-
times infer—the motives of affected constituencies. 
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Notwithstanding the widespread criticisms of accounting rules 
and auditors during the financial moral panic, the new rule turns di-
rectly to existing accounting standards and incorporates them by ref-
erence.204  Specifically, the rule defines an OBS arrangement as one 
of four items: a guarantee obligation captured by the definition in 
FASB Interpretation No. 45;205 a retained or contingent interest in as-
sets transferred to an unconsolidated entity;206 an obligation refer-
enced to the registrant’s stock which is excluded from FASB State-
ment of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133;207 or an obligation 
in a variable interest entity as defined by FASB Interpretation No. 46 
(FIN 46).208  In particular, by internalizing FIN 46, the OBS rule does 
draw some relatively bright lines about the interests subject to con-
solidation.209  However, the standard leaves open important legal 
 
 204 The regulatory definition uses the definitions established by three accounting 
pronouncements: FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 45: 
GUARANTOR’S ACCOUNTING AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR GUARANTEES, 
INCLUDING INDIRECT GUARANTEES OF INDEBTEDNESS OF OTHERS (2002) (hereinafter 
FIN 45), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fin%2045.pdf; STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 133, supra note 192; FIN. ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46: CONSOLIDATION OF VARIABLE INTEREST 
ENTITIES (2003) (hereinafter FIN 46), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fin% 
2046.pdf.  See Item 303(a)(4)(ii) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(4)(ii) 
(2005).  The definition is cross-referenced in several forms and rules.  See, e.g., Form 
8-K, Item 2.03, Instruction 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-
k.pdf.  The SEC had first proposed a rule discussing the new disclosure require-
ments.  See SEC Proposed Rule: Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis 
About Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, Contractual Obligations and Contingent 
Liabilities and Commitments, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 33-8144, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 68054 (Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-
8144.htm.  In response to the proposed rule, most commenters asked the SEC to de-
fine OBS items more precisely.  Disagreement about the type of financial arrange-
ments this definition should capture were the most common remark made by per-
sons and institutions who submitted comments during the proposed rule’s public 
comment period. 
 205 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(4)(ii)(A) (2005). 
 206 Id. at § 229.303(a)(4)(ii)(B). 
 207 Id. at § 229.303(a)(4)(ii)(C). 
 208 Id. at § 229.303(a)(4)(ii)(D). 
 209 For example, FIN 46 increases the minimum amount of third-party equity re-
quired in a special purpose entity to keep the entity off the sponsoring firm’s books 
to ten percent from the previous floor of three percent.  FIN 46, supra note 204, ¶ E-
23.  Before this interpretation, a firm could avoid consolidating any SPE if at least 
three percent of the equity was owned by separate investors.  SPEs that had an effec-
tive external equity of less than three percent contributed to Enron’s downward li-
quidity spiral.  FIN 46 also creates some safe harbors for entities and arrangements 
that need not be consolidated.  FIN 46 excludes the following legal forms from con-
solidation on a reporting firm’s balance sheet: qualifying special purpose entities as 
defined by STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 140, supra note 192, 
certain pension plans, not-for-profit entities, certain entities with interests in variable 
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questions because the Interpretation’s criteria go to the heart of the 
meaning of an equity interest in a firm.210  As a result, the legal use of 
this accounting standard also internalizes interpretive ambiguity, as 
noted by the SEC.211   
These regulatory definitions of OBS arrangements, however, fol-
low the pattern of the financial contracts involved in Enron.  Essen-
tially, it was these types of obligations which led to Enron’s liquidity 
problems,212 raising the question of whether the rule leaves financial 
reporting ready to fight the last war but not the next one.213  More-
 
interest entities created before December 31, 2003, entities meeting the definition of 
a “business” under the standard, and certain other entities.  FIN 46, supra note 204,  
¶ 4. 
 210 The interpretation requires a firm to consolidate any firm that is a variable in-
terest entity, which includes any entity in which the equity investor lacks one or more 
of the following three incidents: 1) the direct or indirect ability to make decisions 
that effect the success of the firm; 2) the obligation to absorb the entity’s expected 
losses; or 3) the right to receive the entity’s residual gains.  FIN 46, supra note 204,  
¶ 14.  As firms further unbundle risk, the question arises about the extent to which 
the firm retains any residual risk or whether that residual risk has been farmed out to 
other investors using OBS arrangements.  For this reason, by turning FIN 46 into 
positive law, the OBS rule sets the stage for judicial adjudications to determine equity 
as an accounting matter.  Those will be interesting cases to observe. 
 211 In its report to Congress, the SEC noted the ambiguity about this accounting 
standard as used in the OBS rule.  See SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 92 (“Although 
Interpretation No. 46(R) constitutes an improvement over the previously existing 
consolidation guidance, a number of interpretive questions remain.  Many users of 
Interpretation No. 46R [sic] find it theoretically and practically challenging to ap-
ply.”).  This is the converse situation to the FASB’s de facto role as disclosure moni-
tor: 
In principle, the jurisdiction of the FASB was said to be the setting of 
financial accounting standards, whereas the jurisdiction of the SEC was 
said to be disclosure.  Yet the distinction has never been well-defined, 
and, as a practical matter, the distinction is not operational.  The stan-
dards of the FASB typically also include disclosure requirements. 
BEAVER, supra note 5, at 12. 
 212 Enron guaranteed several investment contracts to investors who had provided 
the nominal outside capital for the special purpose entities, e.g., Raptor, which En-
ron used to shift liabilities off the balance sheet.  Obligations pegged to Enron com-
mon stock were one of the main triggers of the company’s downward liquidity spiral.  
As Enron’s share price dropped, the company’s obligations to provide additional 
consideration to investors holding these obligations increased, causing a liquidity 
drain for the company.  Many of the special purpose vehicles described in the Powers 
report were variable interest entities.  Relative to these three financial contracts, re-
tained and contingent interests played a smaller role in Enron, although accounting 
for retained interests has been a longstanding issue in connection with securitiza-
tions by banks. 
 213 Beaver notes as much: 
Certainly, the accounting for Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) that was 
at the heart of the problems with Enron’s financial reporting is being 
revisited and rightly so.  However, a revision in this accounting stan-
dard represents a specific fix for a problem involved in a specialized 
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over, given the disclosure threshold adopted by the SEC, Enron 
might not have even had to disclose these particular OBS arrange-
ments.214  Nor would these new requirements have required disclo-
sure of the cash flow games that led to the highly publicized prosecu-
tion of officials at Adelphia Communications.215  In other words, what 
is required to be disclosed is only a subset of the OBS arrangements 
described previously.216 
Despite their under-inclusiveness, the attempt to codify the 
meaning of OBS arrangements in the federal securities regime is a 
good first step.  This is no mean feat, because the OBS sector is where 
the wild things are.217  A brief summary of the major OBS arrange-
ments is in order here.  Many OBS arrangements are voluntary, i.e., 
 
type of transaction and does not in itself address broader issues.  For 
example, obtaining the effects of off-balance sheet financing via derivative 
transactions is a much more pervasive and difficult problem to address. 
Beaver, supra note 104, at 164 (emphasis added). 
 214 Professor Partnoy concurs: 
     Disclosure of “reasonably likely” contingencies would not likely have 
prevented the problems associated with Enron.  Indeed, Enron argua-
bly was in compliance with the newly-enacted SEC regulations.  In as-
sessing the firm’s financial contingencies at the end of 2000, manage-
ment would not have considered a scenario in which Enron’s stock 
price would decline by more than half to be “reasonably likely.” 
Partnoy, supra note 18, at 1278. 
 215 See Triantis, supra note 131, at 12. 
 216 See infra notes 217–24 and accompanying text for a partial taxonomy of OBS 
arrangements. 
 217 Like the joke about the five blind men and the elephant, what is considered 
off-balance-sheet depends on whom you ask: 
     Once upon a time, there were five blind men who had the opportu-
nity to experience an elephant for the first time.  The first approached 
the elephant and, upon encountering one of its sturdy legs, stated, 
“Ah, an elephant is like a tree.”  The second, after exploring the trunk, 
said, “No, an elephant is like a strong hose.”  The third, grasping the 
tail, said, “Fool!  An elephant is like a rope!”  The fourth, playing with 
an ear, stated, “No, more like a fan.”  And the fifth, leaning against the 
animal’s side, said, “An elephant is like a wall.”  The five then began to 
argue loudly about who had the more accurate perception of the ele-
phant. 
     The elephant, tiring of all this abuse, suddenly reared up and 
stomped on all of the men.  He continued to trample them until they 
were nothing but bloody lumps of flesh.  Walking away, the elephant 
said, “It just goes to show that you can’t depend on first impressions.  
When I first saw them I didn’t think they’d be any fun at all.” 
Brad Templeton’s Rec.Humor.Funny, Leading the Blind, http://www.netfunny. 
com/rhf/jokes/88q2/11950.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  What is the moral of 
this story?  Well, beware the all too real consequences of a market practice that you 
have failed to describe properly. 
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contractual, arrangements.218  Banks have long made contingent 
credit commitments to borrowers that may not be reflected on the 
balance sheet, e.g., a depository institution’s letters of credit, finan-
cial guarantees, and other loan commitments.219  Firms use affiliated 
trusts, limited liability partnerships, and limited liability companies to 
avoid recognizing financial activity on the balance sheet.220  Firms ac-
tive in real estate may keep leases and synthetic leases221 off the bal-
ance sheet to reduce the reported firm size and its effective leverage.  
Sometimes a contract substitutes for a special purpose vehicle; for ex-
ample, “take-or-pay” and “throughput” contracts require periodic 
payments for goods or services without regard to whether the buyer 
takes delivery or actually uses the services.222  Another OBS entity, the 
special purpose entity (SPE), is a separate legal person designed to 
serve a single purpose, for example, to hold assets or liquefy receiv-
ables.223  Other OBS liabilities include forward and futures contracts 
 
 218 The broadest construction of the phrase would capture executory contracts, 
employment agreements, licenses, royalty contracts, pension commitments, and 
guarantees to customers under contracts.  See SEC Final Rule, supra note 16.  The 
SEC narrowed the reach of the rule by limiting OBS items to those determined as 
such under certain accounting statements.  Id.  But this produces regulatory renvoi: 
the legal scope of these pronouncements has yet to be determined.  See supra notes 
209–11 and accompanying text. 
 219 See CHRIS J. BARLTROP & DIANA MCNAUGHTON, 2 BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN 
DEVELOPING MARKETS: INTERPRETING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 13 (World Bank 1992) 
(classifying banks’ OBS exposures, including credit substitutes and contingent liabili-
ties).  Assets and asset expectancies may be OBS too.  The same contingent credit 
commitments of the depository institutions described above become assets of the 
lender once the borrower has drawn down on the credit line.  As a credit intermedi-
ary, the function of a bank is to trade in products which reflect the holding prefer-
ences of other market participants with respect to the term and liquidity characteris-
tics of assets and liabilities.  One example of such a product is the bank’s 
commitment to extend credit to a (contingent) borrower in the event that this bor-
rower fails to make payment on another contractual obligation.  If the contingency 
ripens and the borrower draws down on the credit line, this credit exposure of the 
bank shows up as an asset on its balance sheet.  In this sense, asset expectancies may 
also be OBS. 
 220 See Mei Feng, Jeffrey D. Gramlich & Sanjay Gupta, Special Purpose Entities: Em-
pirical Evidence on Determinants and Earnings Management (Jan. 9, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=717301. 
 221 The best of both worlds, a synthetic lease lets the lessor depreciate the asset as 
though she owned it without recognizing the debt that true ownership would have 
entailed.  See John Murray, Off-Balance-Sheet Financing: Synthetic Real Estate, 24 MICH. 
REAL PROP. REV. 5 (1997). 
 222 See generally Soroosh & Ciesielski, supra note 122. 
 223 SPEs are perhaps the OBS arrangement which has generated the most public 
and regulatory interest as of late due to Enron.  Enron made wide use of special pur-
pose entities (SPEs).  It would transfer assets to the SPE, immediately recognize a fi-
nancial accounting gain on the transfer as though sold at arm’s-length, defer the 
recognition of any losses on the transferred assets, and reduce its book leverage by 
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lawsuits and other kinds of liabilities in the form of derivatives, e.g., 
credit derivatives.224  Even this partial taxonomy suggests the breadth 
of the OBS sector. 
B. Persistent Opacity in the Off-Balance-Sheet Sector 
The Act also required the SEC to report on the efficacy of its 
rulemaking to increase the transparency of OBS arrangements.225  
Separately, the Act also directed the SEC to report on the existing 
market structure of OBS arrangements.226  (In a sense, the market 
structure report was intended to serve as a demonstration of the effi-
cacy of the new reporting requirements.)  The SEC filed a single re-
port to Congress addressing both issues.227  Despite noting modest 
improvements in transparency, the report concluded that inadequate 
disclosure of OBS arrangements persisted.228  For example, the SEC 
concluded that financial transparency problems exist with regard to 
the reporting of firms’ investments in other entities,229 of contingent 
 
shifting debt in respect to the assets off of the firm balance sheet.  This worked well 
until the value of Enron stock fell, triggering contractual commitments that taxed 
the firm’s liquidity. 
 224 A forward contract is a present contractual duty to perform at some future 
date.  See INTEREST RATE RISK: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 182, at 96–98.  A 
futures contract is a forward contract that trades on a federally registered commodi-
ties exchange market.  Id. at 93–95.  A credit derivative is a contract that obligates a 
counterparty to indemnify a lender in the event of a credit loss on a loan to a third 
party borrower.  See generally OCC Bulletin, U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, OCC 
96-43: Credit Derivatives (Aug. 12, 1996). 
 225 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 401(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 7261(c)(1) (Supp. II 
2002). 
 226 Id. § 401(c)(2)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 7261(c)(2)(E) (Supp. II 2002). 
 227 See SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 91–98. 
 228 The difficulty that I had locating anecdotal and aggregate information about 
the OBS sector for this Article leads me to join the following SEC conclusion about 
the ongoing underinclusiveness of adequate financial information about the OBS 
sector: 
     Nevertheless, it appears that issuers may not have identified all of 
the off-balance sheet arrangements that are required to be discussed in 
the OBS section of MD&A.  Further, the Staff believes—based in part 
on the difficulties faced in gathering the data necessary for the Study 
and Report—that the quality of the issuer disclosures provided in the 
off-balance sheet section of MD&A can and should be improved. 
Id. at 98. 
 229 The Staff notes that, due to the varying placement of the disclosures and 
the different levels of disclosures required [for investments], it may 
sometimes be difficult for investors to fully comprehend the extent of 
an issuer’s involvement with equity method investments and to compare 
such involvements across issuers.  As a result, the Staff acknowledges 
that the values reported . . . may be understated. 
Id. at 40. 
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obligations and guarantees,230 of derivatives,231 and with respect to 
firms’ OBS arrangements generally.232  These conclusions may under-
state the scope of the problem because the sample that provided the 
filings for the study does not represent the universe of most active us-
ers of OBS arrangements.233  The ongoing opacity of the OBS sector 
may also be due to the SEC’s decision not to require firms to disclose 
comprehensive information about the unconsolidated entities with 
which a firm had OBS transactions.234  Because more is needed in the 
 
 230 “The Staff noted during its analysis of the filings that disclosures about contin-
gent obligations vary widely in terms of format and location in the filing.  As a result, 
the data for contingent obligations was difficult to collect in a consistent manner 
across issuers.”  Id. at 69. 
 231      Despite the disclosures required by the accounting standards and the 
Commission’s rules, there is still often a perceived lack of transparency 
as to an issuer’s market risk exposures, use of derivatives and the poten-
tial impact of those derivatives. . . . 
     . . . . 
     . . . [A]s a result of conducting the Study of filings by issuers, the 
Staff notes that it is often difficult to determine the total dollar 
amounts that are on the balance sheet related to derivatives.  This diffi-
culty stems from the fact that derivatives may be presented as separate 
line items on the balance sheet, or alternatively, included as a compo-
nent of some broader category (e.g., other assets). 
Id. at 80–81. 
 232 “In many cases, it is obvious whether the commitment in question is, indeed, 
on the issuer’s balance sheet (e.g., debt).  However, in some cases, the Staff notes 
that whether the item is on or off the balance sheet remains unclear.”  Id. at 90. 
 233 See SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 27–29.  The study sample was based on the 
100 issuers with the largest capitalization and 100 randomly selected issuers.  Id.  The 
sample selection methodology used by the SEC did not target the actual users of OBS 
arrangements.  The pattern is that firms with greater financial risk tend to use OBS 
arrangements more than firms with less leverage.  The managerial reasons for opti-
mizing the balance sheet discussed earlier explain why this is so.  Had the SEC been 
sensitive to effective capital structure, the sample might have been targeted more 
carefully to identify the firms with the greatest tendency to use OBS arrangements, 
i.e., highly indebted firms interested in reducing the appearance of leverage.  Con-
sequently, a sampling methodology that better targeted active users of OBS ar-
rangements would probably have revealed an even greater degree of opacity in fi-
nancial reporting. 
 234 The SEC’s proposed rule had required disclosure of assets and liabilities of un-
consolidated entities with which a firm had OBS arrangements.  SEC Proposed Rule, 
supra note 204.  In the Final Rule, however, the SEC receded from this requirement: 
     We have eliminated one aspect of the proposed disclosure require-
ments after considering the public commentary.  The amendments do 
not require a registrant to disclose the nature and amount of the total 
assets and total obligations of an unconsolidated entity that conducts 
off-balance sheet activities on behalf of the registrant.  Commenters 
indicated that it might be impracticable to obtain, monitor or evaluate 
information about unconsolidated entities that are unaffiliated with 
the registrant. 
See SEC Final Rule, supra note 16. 
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way of material financial disclosures, Part IV of this Article recom-
mends disclosures to further implement the disclosure objectives of 
the Act. 
It is too early to comprehensively map the ultimate impact of the 
OBS rule, but changes have already occurred.  While disclosing in-
formation about these arrangements may reduce the cost of capital 
for some securities issuers,235 capital costs have, in fact, increased for 
some firms after their disclosure of the existence of OBS arrange-
ments.236  If the past is prologue, firms will certainly minimize the 
compliance costs of the new rule by restructuring their transactions 
to avoid disclosures which adversely impact their capital and liquidity 
activities, leading to a fresh round of financial legerdemain and regu-
latory reprisal.237  Overall, firms will likely reduce their OBS activities, 
especially to avoid the stigma of reporting previously undisclosed li-
 
 235 Cf. Douglas Diamond & Robert Verrecchia, Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of 
Capital, 46 J. FIN. 1325, 1328–32 (1991) (making a mathematical argument that for 
large firms disclosure of financial information may add value by reducing the poten-
tial information asymmetry with investors, who might otherwise refrain from holding 
the securities of those firms). 
 236 See, e.g., Andrew Osterland, Reining In SPEs: New Rules for Special-Purpose Entities 
May Result in Bigger Corporate Balance Sheets, CFO.COM, May 1, 2002, http://www.cfo. 
com/printable/article.cfm/3004484?f=options (describing credit downgrade and 
fifty percent price drop of share price of Adelphia Communications Corp. after it 
disclosed OBS debt in previously unconsolidated special-purpose entities). 
 237 The SEC noted that some companies had already done so: 
     In anticipation of the implementation of Interpretation No. 46 and 
Interpretation No. 46(R), a number of entities restructured arrange-
ments with potential VIEs [variable interest entities] such that they 
would not require consolidation.  Disclosures of such restructurings 
were noted in the [SEC report] sample companies.  The Staff also is 
aware anecdotally that many arrangements with potential VIEs were re-
structured such that the entity either would not be considered a VIE or 
such that no party would be required to consolidate the VIE. 
See SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 92. 
This is another example of the “dance between the regulator and the regu-
lated.”  Pouncy, supra note 2, at 546.  Compliance by restructuring transactions or 
entities is common with respect to accounting standards.  For example, FASB passed 
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 13 [hereinafter SFAS No. 13], 
supra note 121, to increase the reporting of OBS operating leases.  SFAS No. 13 re-
quired firms to include a lease on the balance sheet if the lease possesses any of the 
following four attributes: the lease transfers ownership of the leased asset to the les-
see; the lease lets the lessee purchase the leased asset for a below-market price; the 
lease is not cancelable for 75% or more of the lease’s economic life; or the present 
value of the minimum lease payments on the lease are at least 90% of the leased as-
set’s value.  Id.  Evidence suggests that firms restructured the terms of their capital 
leases to avoid triggering SFAS No. 13’s capitalization requirements.  See Eugene A. 
Imhoff, Jr. & Jacob K. Thomas, Economic Consequences of Accounting Standards: The 
Lease Disclosure Rule Change, 10 J. ACCT. & ECON. 277 (1988) (showing how firms 
modified capital leases to avoid the new disclosure requirement). 
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abilities.238  Some firms are considering the joint venture as an alter-
native to other OBS arrangements.239  Without the cost-savings for-
merly available through OBS arrangements, firms may pass on in-
creased credit costs to their customers.240 
This new regulatory change and the ensuing OBS market struc-
ture shift may also impact the internal management structure of the 
firm.241  For example, consider the emergence of the CFO function as 
a reaction to the increased tactical significance of a firm’s funding ac-
tivities.  Today, the CFO provides strategic decision support for other 
managers rather than merely overseeing what were formerly the 
more ministerial functions of the treasurer and comptroller.242  
 
 238 As noted by accounting researchers: 
This new interpretation might cause very few changes in corporate bal-
ance sheets, because companies that would have to consolidate their 
SPEs under the requirements of this interpretation might already be 
taking steps to shut down or sell their interests prior to the effective 
date.  This scenario would avoid the embarrassment for the sponsors of 
presenting what they never professed to own.  The other alternative is 
that Interpretation 46(R) might cause significant adverse adjustments 
to companies’ balance sheets and create technical defaults in loan 
covenants. 
Soroosh & Ciesielski, supra note 122, at 37. 
 239 See, e.g., Marie Leone, Off-Balance-Sheet Deals: C’est la Vie?, CFO.COM, Jan. 1, 
2003, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3007774?f=related (discussing how some 
corporations look to joint ventures to substitute for investments in securitizations, 
synthetic leases, and unconsolidated entities which must now be disclosed under the 
OBS rule). 
 240 Some banks act as conduit sponsors on behalf of clients.  By requiring the 
sponsor banks to consolidate some previously OBS debt onto the balance sheet, 
banks face regulatory capital charges.  The incidence of this cost does not stay with 
the bank, however.  As one bank manager commented, “If we cannot maintain 
[these loans] off balance sheet, at a minimum our clients’ costs will go up . . . . Worst 
case, we cut their line.”  Brett Nelson, A Blue Summer For Off-Balance-Sheet Lenders?, 
FORBES.COM, Apr. 11, 2003, http://www.forbes.com/2003/04/11/cz_bn_0411banks. 
html (quoting Bradley Schwartz, managing director of asset-backed conduits at J.P. 
Morgan Chase, which administers $17 billion in conduits). 
 241 Patterns of leverage influence how a firm organizes its financial management.  
For example, firms with high leverage appoint a Chief Risk Officer to manage risk 
enterprise-wide.  See André P. Liebenberg & Robert E. Hoyt, The Determinants of En-
terprise Risk Management: Evidence from the Appointment of Chief Risk Officers, 6 RISK 
MGMT. & INS. REV. 37, 45 (2003). 
 242 Typically an accountant, the comptroller acts with actual authority, has some 
general knowledge of the firm’s overall financial position, and reports to an officer.  
Generally a corporate treasurer maintains custody of accounts, manages relation-
ships with creditors, services debt, and coordinates investment.  See JAMES D. WILLSON 
ET AL., CONTROLLERSHIP: THE WORK OF THE MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTANT 19–20 (6th ed. 
1999) (discussing relationship between treasurer, controller, and chief financial offi-
cer).  The comptroller forecasts the raising and utilization of liquidity, reconciles 
bank account balances, and manages internal control systems with respect to receipts 
and disbursements.  Id. at 604–11  A small firm may not separate the treasurer and 
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Unlike the comptroller, a CFO may have significant apparent author-
ity to bind the firm in complex financing transactions.  Poised as a 
convenient folk devil, when a scandal occurs, the CFO is often the 
first officer to be blamed, fired, and, at times, prosecuted for viola-
tions of federal securities laws.  The Act’s attestation requirements 
contribute to this tendency by increasing both the CFO’s significance 
and liability.243 
Despite the congressional mandate, additional funding, the 
agency’s extensive research on the issue, and intense public pressure, 
the SEC could not definitively estimate the size of the OBS sector.  If 
the SEC could not get this information, how could an investor make 
an informed investment decision about these firms?  The purpose of 
the financial transparency ratio suggested in Part IV is to relate po-
tentially material, undisclosed management accounting data about 
OBS arrangements to the balance sheet for the benefit of the wider 
investing public.244 
IV. CONFORMING FINANCIAL REPORTING LAW TO FUNDING VÉRITÉ 
Given the ongoing opacities in the OBS market discussed above, 
more is needed.  I recommend that the SEC take two regulatory ac-
tions to satisfy its duties under the Act to increase financial disclo-
 
the controller function.  Id.  Many firms have brought the comptroller under a Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) to respond to the growing market and legal demands of 
funding.  Christine H. Andersen, The CFO Transformation: From Chief Accountant to 
Change Agent, AME INFO, May 23, 2005, http://www.ameinfo.com/60697.html (em-
phasizing the role of the current CFO as an enterprise-wide risk manager); BOOZ 
ALLEN HAMILTON, CFO THOUGHT LEADERS: ADVANCING THE FRONTIERS OF FINANCE 9–
10 (2005) (cross-industry study of the CFO function at global firms concluding that 
increasingly, CFOs act as change agents rather than accountants).  The CFO’s func-
tions include both overseeing the firm capital structure and the preparation of its 
internal and external financial reports.  In addition to these functions, a CFO typi-
cally also oversees asset investment, accounting, risk management, dividend policy, 
incentive design, tax policy, and cost aspects of compensation policy.  See Thomas 
Copeland, The Expanding Role of the CFO, WEEKLY TOYO KEIZAI (Japan), Sept. 1, 2001, 
available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract =717703.  Increasingly, the CFO engages more 
substantively in decision-support at the executive level than previously and less in 
controlling and reporting transactions.  See GATES, supra note 166, at 26 (conducting 
interviews and surveys of chief financial officers regarding composition of the CFO 
function).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that a growing number of chief executive 
officers served previously as CFOs.  See Copeland, supra.   
 243 See supra note 98 for attestation requirements. 
 244 See supra notes 248–56 and accompanying text (for a ratio that would tell inves-
tors about the magnitude of management accounting data that is not disclosed in 
financial accounting reports). 
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sures.245  First, the SEC should make registrants include a financial 
transparency ratio on their balance sheet that lets readers know the 
magnitude of what is not otherwise being disclosed about OBS items.  
This transparency ratio would act as an interface between the mana-
gerial accounting information (available only to firm insiders) and 
the financial accounting information required to be released by fed-
eral securities law as such.  The transparency ratio would alert inves-
tors to risks the current information asymmetry makes difficult to 
evaluate.246  Second, the SEC should exercise its statutory authorities 
over accounting to make the statement of cash flows more useful as a 
public financial report by introducing some categories, including a 
distinction between operating cash flow and other types.  Finally, a 
bureaucratic reform is in order too.  The SEC should make policy re-
search about trends in effective capital structure a routine part of its 
job, rather than a dramatic interruption of the agency’s perceived 
core functions.  That way, the SEC could proactively deal with future 
funding shifts and their financial reporting implications and, thereby, 
stem future financial moral panics with facts instead of speculation.247  
Being more aggressively self-informed about funding practices would 
reduce the SEC’s risk of reputational slight through congressional 
prodding after celebrated disasters. 
A. Reducing the Public Information Gap with a Financial 
Transparency Ratio 
Being able to determine the inclusiveness of a firm’s reported 
financial position is presumptively material.  Firms must now disclose 
any OBS arrangements material to a firm’s liquidity or capital re-
sources.248  To link the GAAP249 balance sheet to a firm’s effective 
 
 245 These recommendations further the SEC’s policy initiatives set out in its study 
of OBS arrangements.  See SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 98–105.  In particular, dis-
closures of a balance sheet to OBS ratio and funding dynamics that are presump-
tively material (i.e., the two specific recommendations in this Part of the Article) 
would further consistency of financial disclosures, one of the four major initiatives 
discussed in this section of the Report. 
 246 Although the substance of the information would not be internalized into the 
decision-making process of a market participant, the investors would be aware of the 
fact of the information. 
 247 Making recommendations that are capable of being implemented is part of the 
institutional microanalytic approach in law.  “[T]he microanalysis of existing institu-
tions is more practical, at least in the short run, and more amenable to the specifi-
cally legal approach of framing recommendations to existing policymakers.” Rubin, 
supra note 90, at 1431 (arguing that institutional microanalysis can synthesize the his-
torically separate critical disciplines such as alterity jurisprudence and law and eco-
nomics). 
 248 See SEC Final Rule, supra note 16. 
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capital structure, the SEC should require registrants to put a financial 
transparency ratio on the balance sheet.  The ratio would add mar-
ginal value with respect to undisclosed items or to the materiality of a 
firm’s OBS portfolio in the aggregate.250  Inspired by the leverage ra-
tios used in financial analysis, a transparency ratio would reflect the 
proportion of, on the one hand, information required to be disclosed 
under current disclosure standards to, on the other hand, undis-
closed information about contingencies known to the firm through 
its managerial accounting but not required to be revealed under cur-
rent regulatory reporting thresholds.251  In so doing, the ratio would 
lessen information gaps between well-informed firm insiders, moder-
ately-informed institutional investors, and uninformed public share-
holders by signaling how much management accounting data escapes 
disclosure in public reports prepared using financial accounting 
rules.252  This proposal avoids the risk of excess disclosure for complex 
transactions which has been persuasively noted.253 
Such a ratio promotes transparency without risking disclosure 
logorrhea of irrelevant data or requiring firms to disclose sensitive in-
formation about specific financial claims.254  To the extent that the ra-
 
 249 See supra note 10. 
 250 In other words, the ratio would reflect the dollar volume of OBS arrange-
ments, which taken singly would not rise to the level of materiality that currently 
triggers disclosure under the OBS rule.  A firm may have several OBS positions, no 
single one of which materially impacts the firm’s liquidity or capital.  Yet when added 
together the sum of OBS positions becomes material.  The ratio would reveal the po-
tential scope of such a risk. 
 251 Finance ratios use financial statement data to understand and predict firm per-
formance.  See William Beaver, Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure, in EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING: SELECTED STUDIES, 1966, at 71–111 (Sidney Davidson ed., 
1967).  See also KALLBERG & PARKINSON, supra note 3, at 23–31 (summarizing types of 
financial ratios used to evaluate a firm’s liquidity).  Financial leverage measures the 
amount of debt to equity in a firm’s capital structure.  Operating leverage attempts to 
assess the degree to which a firm’s operating costs are fixed.  Meaningfully estimating 
operating leverage is difficult.  Id. at 75.  A firm may calculate its leverage ratios for 
internal use differently from leverage ratios intended for public dissemination. 
 252 See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text (regarding information asym-
metries). 
 253 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2004) (challenging the sufficiency of disclosure of 
complex deals because the disclosure will not yield enough investors who understand 
the transaction in time to impact market prices).  He calls these “disclosure-impaired 
transactions.” Id. at 30. 
 254 The SEC justified its adoption of the “reasonably likely” threshold for disclo-
sure in part on the fear that a lower standard would generate too much information: 
“We believe that the ‘reasonably likely’ threshold best promotes the utility of the dis-
closure requirement by reducing the possibility that investors will be overwhelmed by 
voluminous disclosure of insignificant and possibly unnecessary speculative informa-
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tio draws attention to undisclosed information, this proposal might 
reduce trading liquidity in a firm’s securities.  At its simplest, the ratio 
would compare the size of the reported balance sheet to a pro forma 
balance sheet—based on confidential management accounting in-
formation—that reflected a financial rather than accounting defini-
tion of leverage.  In other words, the numerator of the ratio would be 
the GAAP balance sheet and the denominator would be an effective 
balance sheet.255  To calculate such a ratio would require auditors to 
systematically review confidential management accounting data and 
to put it in the context of publicly available information.  A ratio of 
1:1 would signal perfect transparency.  The lower the ratio, e.g., 1:2, 
the less the amount of financial transparency in the firm’s public fi-
nancial reports.  A low financial transparency ratio might signal du-
bious financial reporting motives.256  (For example, a firm may want 
to hide a higher leverage ratio or a concentration of debt contracts 
coming due for renegotiation.)  By reminding the reader of financial 
statements of the limits of the balance sheet, the ratio would provide 
fair notice that an investor may need to poke around in a firm’s fi-
nancial reports.  Changes in the ratio would also alert a reader as to 
whether a firm was changing its fundamental strategy with respect to 
the transparency of its funding practices. 
B. Using Cash Flow Reporting to Further Disaggregate the Firm 
Adding some reporting granularity to the statement of cash flows 
would help investors and other market intermediaries to evaluate a 
firm’s funding position by reducing the transaction costs of monitor-
ing the firm’s cash flows.257  Doing this would further the SEC’s stated 
 
tion.”  See SEC Final Rule, supra note 16, at 7.  In that same vein, a prominent scholar 
of securitizations and their disclosure implications believes that disclosure of enough 
information to understand certain OBS deals would overwhelm readers of financial 
reports.  See Schwarcz, supra note 253, at18–19 (challenging the sufficiency of disclo-
sure of complex deals because the disclosure will not yield enough investors who un-
derstand the transaction in time to impact market prices).  He calls these “disclosure-
impaired transactions.” Id. at 30. 
 255 The denominator could include the four arrangements listed in the OBS rule.  
Managers would still use their own judgment when deciding whether an item met 
the materiality threshold for disclosure, but the practice of calculating the ratio 
would complement the OBS rule. 
 256 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.  Research also notes that financial 
transparency may be correlated with creditworthiness.  For example, more creditwor-
thy firms are willing to disclose debt on the balance sheet, while firms interested in 
managing their credit rating more carefully may prefer OBS financing. 
 257 See BEAVER, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that the value of accounting disclosures 
depends on the processing costs of the data to the user). 
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policy of encouraging disclosure of material information about fund-
ing.258 
The statement of cash flows distinguishes between investment, 
operational, and financing cash flows.259  However, the statement cur-
rently blurs two streams of investment cash flow that would have 
more informational value if unbundled: (1) that from investment in 
assets related to a firm’s core functions; and (2) that due to invest-
ments in other than operational assets.  By separating operational in-
vestment cash flow from market investment cash flow the classification 
would let the reader distinguish between investment required by the 
firm’s core activities and that from the firm’s activities as a speculative 
investor in the market.  Such a distinction would help an investor to 
appreciate whether cash flow is attributable to business decisions 
about operations or to speculative investment decisions. 
Since the statement of cash flows reflects the impact of much 
OBS activity,260 comparing the volume of cash flow overall to a firm’s 
risk capital in the form of a ratio would reflect the effective ability of a 
firm to leverage risk capital into liquidity.  Abnormally high cash flow 
leverage ratios—or unusual trends in a firm’s cash flow leverage ra-
tio—could signal risk from OBS activities.261 
 
 258 In response to a petition from several accounting firms, the SEC had—before 
the OBS rulemaking—issued a statement calling for improvement of the quality of 
disclosure of OBS arrangements and clarifying the scope of registrants’ then-duties 
under Regulation S-K, Item 303.  Commission Statement about Management’s Dis-
cussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Release Nos. 
33-8056, 34-45321 (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-
8056.htm.  This guidance emphasized the cause and effect relationship between OBS 
activity and a firm’s solvency and liquidity: 
[R]egistrants should consider describing the sources of short-term 
funding and the circumstances that are reasonably likely to affect those 
sources of liquidity. . . . 
     . . . . 
     If the registrant’s liquidity is dependent on the use of off-balance 
sheet financing arrangements, such as securitization of receivables or 
obtaining access to assets through special purpose entities, the regis-
trant should consider disclosure of the factors that are reasonably likely 
to affect its ability to continue using those off-balance sheet financing 
arrangements. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 259 For a discussion of the statement of cash flows, see SEC REPORT, supra note 17, 
at 11–14. 
 260 See supra note 170–71, 179–81 and accompanying text. 
 261 So, for example, Enron’s cash flow games described in Part II.B might have 
been reflected through such ratio analysis. 
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C. Exploiting the SEC’s Comparative Advantage to Conduct Capital 
Structure Market Surveillance 
The financial moral panic revealed technical gaps in the SEC’s 
capital structure knowledge, an agency whose institutional structure 
emphasizes disclosure and enforcement.262  This enforcement empha-
sis means that the contours of current law determine the agency’s ef-
fective knowledge base.263  A more institutionally pervasive focus on 
capital market structure would complement the SEC’s current ap-
proaches.264  The General Accounting Office recently noted these lim-
its: 
 Both SEC and industry officials agree that the current level of 
human capital and budgetary resources has strained SEC’s capac-
ity to address current and evolving market issues.  Industry offi-
cials generally hold SEC staff in high regard and said that SEC 
does a good job overall.  However, industry officials also said that 
they would like to see SEC devote more effort to evolving and on-
going areas . . . .265 
Although the agency has conducted special industry studies to 
cover self-diagnosed technical gaps, it failed to do so in time to deal 
with the crises in the OBS sector.266  Accordingly, the Act directs the 
 
 262 For example, the focus of the Division of Enforcement—a historically and in-
creasingly prominent function at the SEC—requires market knowledge only as 
needed to supplement legal claims in an enforcement action.  In contrast, the few 
units that interact with firms regularly know the most about market structure. 
 263 Some exceptions are worth noting.  The Office of Risk Management (Division 
of Market Regulation) monitors compliance by registered broker-dealers with the 
liquidity requirements of the net capital rule for broker-dealers.  This Office has rich 
firm-level knowledge that could usefully be synthesized into a better understanding 
of broker-dealer market structure.  See generally Michael P. Jamroz, The Net Capital 
Rule, 47 BUS. LAW. 863 (1992) (describing in significant detail how the net capital 
rule ensures the liquidity of broker-dealers).  When I worked in the Office of Com-
pliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE), I was enriched by regular and com-
prehensive contact with broker-dealers, securities exchanges, clearing and depository 
entities, and other financial intermediaries.  See generally John H. Walsh, Right the First 
Time: Regulation, Quality, and Preventive Compliance in the Securities Industry, 1997 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 165, 177–78 (1997) (describing OCIE’s statutory authorities and 
programs). 
 264 Respectful of the agency staff’s commitment to capital markets, I make these 
recommendations in the spirit of preserving the agency’s reputation as a jewel of the 
New Deal. 
 265 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SEC OPERATIONS: INCREASED WORKLOAD CREATES 
CHALLENGES, GAO-02-302, at 24 (2002) (finding that securities market structure 
changes had dramatically increased the volume and complexity of the SEC’s work-
load and recommending increased capacity for the agency).  See also HEARINGS, supra 
note 55, at 620. 
 266 See, e.g., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK (1988) (ana-
lyzing the causes of market volatility that led to a thirty percent loss in the value of 
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SEC to increase its technical expertise not just with respect to OBS 
arrangements but also securities violators and violations,267 enforce-
ment actions,268 and credit rating agencies,269 suggesting the need for 
the SEC to retool its market structure knowledge generally.270  The 
Act’s directions to the General Accounting Office to conduct capital 
market studies more typically in the SEC’s bailiwick raise questions of 
whether the SEC has already lost some reputational capital with Con-
gress.271 
Congress has enabled the agency to update its institutional mis-
sion by increasing its appropriation and reducing the transaction 
costs of hiring technical experts.  First, Congress gave the SEC pay 
parity with depository institution regulators, who have long been able 
to pay staff more than the salaries on the General Service scheduler.272  
 
traded common stocks); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., JOINT REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES 
MARKET (1992) (examining government securities market structure and considering 
regulatory approaches after a bidding regularity in the government securities auc-
tion); Report of Investigation Pursuant Regarding the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., Se-
curities Exchange Act Release No. 51163 (Feb. 9, 2005), available at http://www.sec. 
gov/litigation/investreport/34-51163.htm (investigating market maker practices in 
the over-the-counter market).  The pattern is that crises trigger self-directed studies 
of a particular market problem. 
 267 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 703, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 note (GAO Study and Re-
port Regarding Consolidation of Public Accounting Firms) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 268 Id. § 704. 
 269 Id. § 702. 
 270 Congress’s direction to the SEC to conduct these studies suggests a critique of 
how the agency has handled the make-buy problem as applied to certain knowledge 
about capital market structure.  The make-buy problem takes a different form in the 
context of a federal agency.  Statutes determine the agency’s freedom to determine 
what goes on and what stays out, i.e., its institutional structure. 
 271 Sarbanes-Oxley requires the Comptroller General to study the impact of re-
quiring mandatory rotation of registered accounting firms (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 § 207), the impact of the consolidation of accounting firms on public audit 
quality (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 701) and the relationship of investment banks 
and their advisors earnings management by private firms (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 § 705).  Tasking the GAO with studies that fit squarely within the SEC’s jurisdic-
tion may reflect a desire not to burden the SEC with more studies.  But one wonders 
whether Congress doubted whether the SEC had enough internal knowledge, capital 
and willingness to address these questions, which bear importantly on market struc-
ture, or whether the GAO studies reflect a desire to have independent analysis with 
which to critically evaluate the performance of the SEC. 
 272 Previously, Congress had exempted the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union Administration from 
statutory ceilings on staff compensations.  Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery 
and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 805, 1105, 1202, 1203, 1206, 
103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).  In re-
sponse to vigorous SEC advocacy, Congress extended the same pay parity privileges 
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More recently, Congress increased the SEC’s flexibility in hiring ac-
countants, economists, and securities analysts.273  Increased resources 
without a more comprehensive market structure approach to capital 
structure surveillance will not, however, solve the regulatory report-
ing problems highlighted by these scandals.274  Therefore, to deal with 
this problem the SEC should establish a research and analysis unit 
(or reconfigure existing institutional resources) to exploit the SEC’s 
existing knowledge base and to add to it by closely following trends in 
effective capital structure.275  This the SEC can do with the approval of 
a majority of commissioners before Congress acts remedially again.276  
Such a unit could best exploit the agency’s informational advantage 
about how firms finance themselves.277  The SEC’s § 401(c) report278 is 
 
to the SEC.  Investor and Capital Markets Fee Relief Act, Pub. L. NO. 107-123, §8, 115 
Stat. 2390 (2002). 
 273 Accountant, Compliance, and Enforcement Staffing Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-44, 117 Stat. 842.  The law allows the SEC to appoint these staff to the excepted 
service rather than the competitive service, which restricts employer discretion to re-
deploy or discharge staff more than the excepted service. 
 274 A small number of economists in the Office of Economic Analysis participate 
in a wide variety of regulatory, surveillance, and enforcement functions.  This office 
needs more financial economists specifically trained in monitoring trends in firms’ 
effective capital structure. 
 275 Drawing again on bank regulation, I urge the SEC to disrupt the Weberian 
logic of its current departmental structure and to consider the usefulness of an inter-
divisional approach to capital structure surveillance.  The Capital Steering Commit-
tee (Capital Steering) of the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller) is an exam-
ple of an inter-divisional process that targets OBS items.  Like any complex govern-
ment bureaucracy, the Comptroller is functionally divided into a legal division, 
banking supervision divisions, a special unit that looks at regulatory capital policy, 
international divisions, and risk management divisions.  Recognizing that OBS fund-
ing crosses these organizational units, the Comptroller has a standing inter-divisional 
process in Capital Steering to bring together legal, risk, and supervisory perspectives 
when ruling on national banks’ funding practices.  Capital Steering meets regularly 
to review proposals for funding products submitted by national banks.  In the meet-
ing, capital policy staff explain the funding products—many of which are OBS 
items—in order to educate staff from other divisions.  By institutionalizing informa-
tion sharing about the frontiers of national banks’ OBS activities, Capital Steering 
keeps the Comptroller’s knowledge base about funding current. 
 276 Institutional theory about innovation in government bureaucracy, however, 
indicates that the suggestion to form a capital structure analysis unit will not be 
adopted.  See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 219–49 
(1996) (identifying structural institutional forces that restrict innovative change). 
 277 For example, in 2000, the SEC received nearly 100,000 separate filings by issu-
ers describing securities products and transactions, a cornucopia of data about finan-
cial market structure.  See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 265 (finding that 
securities market structure changes had dramatically increased the volume and com-
plexity of the SEC’s workload and recommending increased capacity for the agency).  
The Division of Corporate Finance has the most complete knowledge base about fi-
nancing trends because the unit reviews prospectuses about new securities.  A Webe-
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an example of the kind of aggregate market structure analysis that 
should be a routine matter for the agency. 
At present, decisions about materiality are left to individual pub-
lic companies, subject to adjudication to determine whether with the 
benefit of hindsight a registrant properly evaluated the materiality of 
a particular financial fact.279  Given the recurring funding situations 
faced by firms, though, some financing practices are presumptively 
material, as a matter of effective capital structure.  However, judges, 
lawyers, and investors do not have the benefit of market-wide data 
when interpreting materiality.  Armed with such market-wide knowl-
edge, the SEC could provide more interpretive advice in the context 
of market structure as a whole.  Information intermediaries like in-
vestment advisors and business newspapers would disseminate this in-
formation to a wider investing public.  Better capital structure surveil-
lance would also help the SEC to exercise its oversight duties over the 
new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board created by the 
Act.280 
 
rian bureaucracy, the Division divides prospectus review by industry such that few 
staff know more than one industry well. 
 278 See SEC Report, supra note 17. 
 279 A presumption encourages uniformity in an area that few investors and other 
market participants understand, lets registrants rebut this presumption in circum-
stances in which the financing trend does not materially impact a firm’s liquidity or 
capital, and preserves judicial discretion to determine when a rebuttal of the pre-
sumption is justified.  This approach is also consistent with the tacit recognition in 
financial reporting law that certain events are deemed to be so material to a firm that 
a public issuer must file a Form 8-K as required by 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2005). 
 280 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is a private non-
profit organization.  It oversees public company audits by developing audit stan-
dards, inspecting accounting firms, investigating and disciplining auditors, and con-
ducting disciplinary proceedings.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 101, 107, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 7211, 7217 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).  The SEC appoints Board members, 
approves Board rules and professional standards, approves the Board’s budget, and 
acts as an appellate body for disciplinary actions and disputes arising from the 
Board’s inspection reports.  See generally Richard I. Miller & Paul H. Pashkoff, Regula-
tions Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Oct. 2002, at 33, available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/PUBS/JOFA/oct2002/miller.htm (summarizing the implica-
tions of the Act for the auditing profession).  To date, the Board has registered 1522 
audit firms.  See PCAOB, Registered Public Accounting Firms, http://www.pcaobus. 
org/Registration/Registered_Firms.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).  Eventually the 
Board expects to have 200 full-time staff.  See Accounting Under Sarbanes-Oxley: Are Fi-
nancial Statements More Reliable? Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 4 
(2003) (testimony of William J. McDonough, Chairman, Public Company Account-
ing Oversight Board), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS47468.  This 
was the first hearing that Congress convened after the Act to review its implementa-
tion.  Congress then held a second hearing to review progress further.  Hearings on 
Sarbanes-Oxley: Two Years of Market and Investor Recovery Before the H. Comm. on Financial 
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V. THERE WILL ALWAYS BE AN ENRON (PROLEGOMENON) 
We live in an economy organized around market risk, in which 
unrealized gain in financial assets will continue to be the chief store 
of wealth.  Preserving the dignity of investors requires clearer disclo-
sure about the market risk of unrealized gain, sobering though such 
disclosure may be.  Not that any of this will prevent future financial 
disasters.  So long as there are firms trying to economize on funding 
efficiencies (for both fiduciary and opportunistic motives), traders 
willing to help, and investors looking for a financial return, there will 
always be an Enron.281   
Given this structural implication of the rules of the game, it 
would behoove the legal profession to produce lawyers who are more 
financially fluent.  Hindsight tells the repeat players in law school—
law professors and deans—that some students may have a calling for 
transactional finance.  These students are generally underserved by 
the current curriculum at many law schools.282  Forced to take a ran-
dom walk through the first year of law school, they typically begin 
upper-level courses without the basic analytical methods in finance, 
accounting, and game theory.  Increasingly, these methods inform 
the performance expectations for an effective transactional lawyer, 
especially one who will be advising a chief financial officer, poised as 
the office is to bear liability and calumnies, especially after recent his-
tory’s devilish depiction of this corporate official.  For these students, 
fewer brambles and more financial analytic methods are needed.  In 
closing, I call on my transactional law colleagues to foster more inte-
gration of analytical financial methods into a basic legal education.  
Such an approach might produce more transactional lawyers capable 
of spotting and stemming future financial moral panics. 
 
 
Services, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/ 
LPS56380. 
 281 That conclusion is implied in the idea of the “regulatory dialectic.”  See Pouncy, 
supra note 2, at 546. 
 282 One exception is the positive trend in legal education towards increased train-
ing for law students in transactional law in the development of analytical methods 
courses.  See, e.g., HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 
(1989) (assembles game theory, accounting, finance, statistics, and other transac-
tional methodologies for use in a first-year or upper-level law school course).  An 
elective first-year methods class at Harvard Law School uses this book, a fitting pen-
ance from the institution that helped to fossilize the Langdellian approach in the 
first place. 
